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Article 
Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination 
LEA SHEPARD 
Employers’ use of credit reports to evaluate prospective job applicants 
has generated considerable scrutiny in the popular press and academic 
literature, but few proposals for reform.  This Article explores three 
possible ways of reducing the risk of financial history discrimination in the 
employment setting. 
First, imposing inquiry limits on employers’ use of credit reports, a 
policy recently adopted or under consideration in the majority of states, is 
unlikely to be effective, since states’ inquiry limits are currently narrowly 
drafted and therefore advance few anti-discriminatory objectives.  In 
addition, inquiry limits cannot prevent self-interested individuals from 
voluntarily revealing their credit histories and other financial history 
information, a shortcoming that triggers the game-theoretic “unraveling” 
process.  Second, most attempts to improve consumers’ participatory role 
in employers’ evaluation processes can only superficially combat financial 
history discrimination, since these efforts are likely to produce unreliable 
information, and they may have a regressive impact. 
Given the limitations of these options, the Article considers to what 
extent a third approach—encouraging employers to use an empirically 
derived, statistically sound evaluation method to scrutinize applicants—
can combat discrimination.  Although an empirical method—an adaptation 
of credit scoring methodologies for use by employers—is imperfect, it can 
help to reduce the likelihood of implicit bias and stereotyping that is 
inherent in employers’ current subjective analyses of the raw data in credit 
reports.  While antidiscrimination initiatives have traditionally focused on 
withholding information from decision-makers, where suppression of 
information is impracticable, the contrary approach may be more likely to 
advance sustained reform efforts. 
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Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination 
LEA SHEPARD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A job seeker’s to-do list is extensive and laborious.  He must complete 
formal and informal education and job training programs, earning the 
credentials necessary to achieve threshold competency in a given position.  
He must research suitable job openings.  He must update his résumé and 
submit required paperwork, which highlight his strengths and 
communicate succinctly to a prospective employer why the applicant is a 
desirable candidate for a given position.  He must prepare adequately for 
one or more interviews.  He must submit favorable references or letters of 
recommendation to employers, which provide important endorsements 
from the applicant’s past life.  
A prudent job applicant must also complete an important step in 
financial hygiene that he might otherwise overlook: a credit report1 check.  
Because approximately sixty percent of employers consult applicants’ 
credit reports in making hiring decisions,2 a job applicant would be wise to 
scrutinize his report in advance of an employer’s formal vetting process to 
ensure that no information in the report is incomplete or inaccurate.3  An 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law School; 
A.B., Duke University.  I am grateful to Dan Krivinskas, Donna Krivinskas, Spencer Shepard IV, and 
all attendees of the Washington University Junior Faculty Workshop for their helpful feedback.  I am 
also grateful to all attendees of the American Association of Law Schools Debtor-Creditor section’s 
annual meeting for comments on my companion article.  My library liaison, Patricia Scott, and my 
research assistant, Hanah Harris, provided excellent research support. 
1 Although this Article uses the terms “credit report” and “consumer report” interchangeably, the 
former term is narrower than the latter.  Protecting Consumers’ Data: Policy Issues Raised by 
ChoicePoint, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 6–7 (2005) (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of 
the Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050315protectingconsume
rdata.pdf.  The term “consumer report” refers collectively to all reports issued to both creditors and 
non-creditors (e.g., insurers, employers, and landlords).  Id. at 7 n.11. 
2 Background Checking: Conducting Credit Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCES 
MGMT. slide 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/Backgro
undChecking.aspx [hereinafter Background Checking]. 
3 Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the federal statute that governs the use of credit 
reports by creditors, employers, and insurers, consumers are entitled to a free copy of their consumer 
report from each of the three nationwide consumer reporting agencies (Experian, Equifax, and Trans 
Union) once every twelve months.  15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also Chereen Zaki, Want a 
Job? Raise Your Credit Score, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chereenzaki/2012
/03/16/want-a-job-raise-your-credit-score (listing the three companies that provide the reports). 
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applicant whose credit report reveals financial problems may seek to 
improve his credit profile by correcting errors, paying down debts, or 
settling delinquencies.4 
Job applicants with adverse credit histories—those that reflect 
collection actions, bankruptcies, or high debt-to-income ratios—are at a 
competitive disadvantage.  Employers are prone to make a multitude of 
negative assumptions about such individuals: they are more likely to be 
irresponsible,5 more likely to commit fraud or theft on the job,6 more 
susceptible to bribery and blackmail,7 or more likely to be distracted by 
financial worries or collection activity.8 
Employers’ consideration of applicants’ financial histories has 
generated significant doubts among scholars and legislators.9  These 
                                                                                                                          
4 See, e.g., Zaki, supra note 3 (describing ways to increase one’s credit score in order to improve 
job prospects). 
5 See, e.g., Vicious Cycle, BUCKS CTY. COURIER TIMES, Nov. 21, 2012, at A12 (“Ballooning 
credit card balances, missed loan and bill payments, late charges and other penalties can make anybody 
look like an irresponsible deadbeat.  And, consequently, a risky hire.”); Heather Huhman, When 
Employers Look into Your Credit History, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 22, 2011), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2011/07/22/when-employers-look-into-
your-credit-history (“Your credit report gives employers a sense of your responsibility level in your 
personal life.  If you haven’t done anything to improve your credit or continue to be irresponsible with 
money, it’s a bad sign for employers looking to hire you.”). 
6 See, e.g., Huhman, supra note 5 (“Some employers believe people with large debts or credit 
problems could be more likely to steal or commit fraud, which organizations can’t afford, especially in 
today’s down economy.”); Why Filing Bankruptcy Might Be the Worst Thing You Could Do for Your 
Career, BUS. INSIDER (May 13, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-filing-bankruptcy-might-
be-the-worst-thing-you-could-do-for-your-career-2012-5 (explaining that employers consult applicants’ 
credit histories in part because credit checks “allow[] them to identify potential theft risks: Employees 
with debts are among the most likely to steal from their employers”). 
7 Sean Reilly, Personal Debt Sinks More Clearances, FED. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at 1 (reporting 
that many prospective federal employees with adverse financial backgrounds have been denied security 
clearances, because a large debt load “could heighten someone’s vulnerability to bribery or 
blackmail”).   
8 See Brian M. Kalish, Freed from Financial Burden: Noninsurance Offerings Provide a Way to 
Help Ease Employees’ Financial Stressors and Improve Workplace Productivity, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, 
Feb. 2013, at 28, 28 (citing study that concludes that financial difficulties increase employee 
absenteeism and decrease employee productivity).   
9 See, e.g., Loren W. Brown, Credit Report: An Acceptable Aid to the Hiring Decision?, 39 W. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2011) (discussing the effectiveness of credit report use in the employment setting 
and observing that although reports may seem useful to employers, no definitive studies establish that 
they predict employee behavior); Roberto Concepción, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: 
Effectuating Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and Business 
Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523, 535–41 (2010) (questioning whether credit histories reflect traits relevant 
to job success); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1695, 1722–43 (2012) (conducting a normative assessment of the merits of credit report use by 
employers); Deborah Thorne, Personal Bankruptcy and the Credit Report: Conflicting Mechanisms of 
Social Mobility, 11 J. POVERTY, No. 4, 2008, at 23, 27–28, 41–42 (describing credit reports as 
impeding the upward social mobility otherwise triggered by a bankruptcy filing); Ruth Desmond, 
Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and Privacy in the Employment Context: The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and the Equal Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 910–13 (2010) 
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commentators have questioned whether a valid correlation exists between 
adverse financial histories and employees’ job performance.10  Some have 
also expressed concerns that the practice, although intended to promote 
debt-repayment, may have an adverse effect on social mobility and racial 
equality.11  Others have populist misgivings that the use of credit reports in 
the employment setting compounds the economic pain of consumers 
recovering from a financial crisis for which many disparate actors share 
blame.12 
Although employers’ use of consumer reports has generated helpful 
normative critiques, few have critically evaluated possible solutions to the 
problems triggered by the practice.  In this timely companion piece to my 
normative analysis of financial history discrimination,13 I address this 
important gap in the scholarly literature.  I evaluate three divergent ways of 
reducing the risk of financial history discrimination in the employment 
setting: (1) banning the use of consumer reports; (2) giving applicants a 
greater voice in employers’ assessment processes, consistent with rights 
afforded to consumers in analogous settings; and (3) encouraging 
employers to use an empirically derived, statistically sound method to 
evaluate applicants’ credit histories. 
States’ primary response to the threat of financial history 
discrimination has been to attempt to ban the use of credit reports in the 
hiring process.14  I argue that although bans reflect a seemingly robust 
                                                                                                                          
(describing how credit reports both benefit employers and contribute to discrimination); Kelly 
Gallagher, Note, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for 
“Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1604–07 (2006) (detailing how 
employers’ use of credit reports perpetuate discrimination and harm poorer applicants). 
10 See, e.g., AMY TRAUB, DƜMOS, DISCREDITED: HOW EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS KEEP 
QUALIFIED WORKERS OUT OF A JOB 14 (2013) available at 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Discredited-Demos.pdf (“[T]here is little or 
no evidence that any data on personal credit history is relevant to employment . . . .”).   
11 See, e.g., id. at Executive Summary (“African American and Latino households have worse 
credit, on average, than white households.  As a result, employment credit checks may 
disproportionately screen people of color out of jobs, leading to discriminatory hiring.”). 
12 See, e.g., Saki Knafo, How Bad Credit Reports Keep People Unemployed, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/04/bad-credit-reports-
unemployment_n_2807939.html (“[T]he debts incurred during the recession have prevented people 
from getting back on their feet and paying back what they owe, trapping them in a vicious cycle of debt 
and unemployment.”). 
13 See generally Shepard, supra note 9, at 172238 (discussing how employers’ consideration of 
financial histories impacts debt-repayment incentives, social mobility, and racial equality). 
14 At the time of this writing, eight states—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—have passed laws restricting employers’ use of consumer reports.  
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West Supp. 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51tt (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 378-2(a)(8) (2011); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10 (West Supp. 2013); MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (2011); 21 VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020 (West 2013).  
Seventeen more states and the District of Columbia are considering adopting similar legislation.  Use of 
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response to the risk of financial history discrimination, they are unlikely to 
be effective.  First, state laws in their current form are narrowly drafted 
and, as a result, make few changes to the status quo.  Thus, these 
restrictions advance few anti-discriminatory objectives.  Second, even if 
these laws were more broadly drafted and vigorously enforced, they could 
not easily prevent individuals from voluntarily disclosing their financial 
histories to employers, a shortcoming that triggers the game-theoretic 
“unraveling” process. 
As Douglas Baird, Scott Peppet, and other scholars of game theory 
have observed, in situations in which asymmetric information exists 
between two parties, an individual who holds favorable verifiable 
information has an incentive to reveal that information to an uninformed 
party.15  In the employment setting, those applicants with the strongest 
financial histories—those that reflect no adverse events like bankruptcy 
filings or debt-collection actions—are likely to reveal their financial 
history information to employers in order to gain a competitive advantage.  
If these self-interested actors disclose their financial history information 
for personal or economic gain, other applicants—including those with less 
favorable financial histories—in turn will be compelled to make similar 
disclosures, since those who fail to disclose will be penalized.16  If an 
applicant fails to reveal her credit score or credit history, either overtly or 
through information “signaling,”17 an employer will infer that the applicant 
is withholding negative information.18  Faced with the choice between 
disclosure and the stigma associated with failure to disclose, an applicant 
will choose to reveal her financial history.  This Article argues that the 
strong likelihood of unraveling—made more acute by rights afforded to 
applicants under consumer-protection laws and by developments in 
information technology—promises to disrupt states’ enforcement of 
financial history bans.   
                                                                                                                          
Credit Information in Employment 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-info-in-employ-2012-legis.aspx (last 
updated Mar. 6, 2013).  
15 E.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY 
AND THE LAW 90–91 (1994); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the 
Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1177 (2011). 
16 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 117677 (“Eventually, even those with the worst private 
information . . . may realize that they have little choice but to disclose to avoid the stigma of keeping 
information secret.”). 
17 Applicants can “signal” the strength of their financial backgrounds to prospective employers 
through various proxies instead of formally disclosing their credit histories.  Id. at 1162.  For example, 
an applicant could signal the absence of student loan debt (and, therefore, the likely absence of any 
student loan delinquencies) by disclosing that she received a scholarship that covered all or the vast 
majority of her educational expenses.  See infra notes 14954 and accompanying text. 
18 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1176 (stating that as disclosure becomes the norm, “keeping one’s 
personal prospectus private may become suspect”). 
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As an alternative to restricting employers’ use of applicants’ credit 
histories, policymakers could pursue a more nuanced approach and attempt 
to give applicants a greater participatory role in employers’ assessment 
processes.  Policymakers could institutionalize and expand a right that 
some employers already claim to give select applicants: the right to explain 
to an employer the circumstances that may have contributed to an adverse 
financial event like a bankruptcy filing or a debt-collection action.19  I refer 
to this right as the “Mitigation Opportunity.”  I consider how the 
Mitigation Opportunity could be enhanced consistent with similar rights 
consumers enjoy in analogous settings: in the context of creditors’ and 
insurers’ consideration of credit histories.20  
Expanding the Mitigation Opportunity seemingly provides an 
individualized approach to an otherwise bureaucratic and impersonal 
assessment method.  It gives some credence to the “situationist” account of 
human behavior endorsed by behavioral realists—an approach that 
recognizes that “unseen or unappreciated influences” within individuals 
and in society heavily influence individuals’ actions and circumstances.21   
I argue, however, that most attempts to improve consumers’ 
participatory role in employers’ evaluation processes can only superficially 
combat financial history discrimination.  Because applicants’ explanations 
for adverse financial events are largely subjective and not easily verified, 
they would likely have little impact on employers’ decision-making 
processes.  Likewise, even if employers were required to consider 
applicants’ explanations,22 those applicants who can provide the most 
convincing explanations to employers are not necessarily more deserving 
of special treatment.  Rather, those individuals are more likely to be 
financially literate and financially sophisticated.  In other words, requiring 
employers to consider candidates’ explanations can have a regressive 
impact on employers’ evaluation processes.23 
While increasing consumers’ participatory role will not benefit 
applicants, such a reform would likely benefit employers in a pragmatic 
sense.  By taking steps to increase the perceived legitimacy and procedural 
fairness of using credit histories, employers can opportunistically forestall 
                                                                                                                          
19 See infra Part IV.A. 
20 Creditors use credit scores to quantify the credit risk posed by a prospective or current 
borrower.  See infra note 37 and accompanying text.  Insurers use insurance scores (which are derived 
from credit reporting data) to estimate the number or total cost of insurance claims that prospective 
policyholders are likely to file.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
21 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of 
Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 314 (2008). 
22 Some insurers who use credit data in setting insurance rates must consider whether prospective 
policyholders’ credit histories were influenced by extraordinary life events.  See infra notes 17980 and 
accompanying text. 
23 See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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regulation by reducing the likelihood that lawmakers would, in response to 
public complaints, ban the practice altogether.24 
Given the limitations of banning employers’ consideration of 
applicants’ financial histories and of increasing applicants’ participatory 
role in employers’ assessment processes, this Article considers an 
alternative.  It explores the possibility that a third, somewhat 
counterintuitive approach—encouraging employers to use an empirically 
derived, statistically sound evaluation method—can more realistically 
combat discrimination.   
Currently, employers use only the raw data in consumer reports to 
make assessments about applicants.  They do not use credit scores.25  In 
other words, employers infer from applicants’ personal information, 
payment history, and public record information whether applicants possess 
certain personality traits important to success in the workplace.26  
Likewise, employers do not commit in advance to the criteria by which 
applicants’ credit reports will be measured.  As a result, employers’ current 
assessment methods can yield idiosyncratic and subjective decisions about 
applicants.  Indeed, employers’ current evaluation techniques, I argue, are 
analogous to the “judgmental” underwriting techniques used by creditors 
before the widespread adoption of credit scores in the 1970s and 1980s.27  
Judgmental underwriting has been known to generate inaccurate, 
inconsistent, and discriminatory decision making.28   
Some of the problems caused by employers’ current assessment 
methods could be alleviated if employers instead adopted an empirical 
approach—one analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores and insurers’ 
use of credit-based insurance scores.  In other words, just as creditors use 
credit data to evaluate an applicant’s creditworthiness and insurers use 
credit histories to price insurance policies, employers could use applicants’ 
credit information to measure whether, in fact, financial histories are 
predictive of personality traits relevant to job performance (including, for 
example, conscientiousness and responsibility). 
An employment scoring model will not eliminate discrimination; 
indeed, the practice could have a disproportionately adverse impact on 
                                                                                                                          
24 See infra notes 18284 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 5455 and accompanying text. 
26 See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7 (presenting results of employer poll on credit 
report use and describing the information that is most likely to affect an employer’s decision to not 
extend a job offer). 
27 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT 
SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT, at O-4 (2007) 
[hereinafter FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING] (“Before the introduction of credit scoring, the 
evaluation of creditworthiness was conducted manually and judgmentally by loan officers relying 
primarily on experience and subjective assessments of credit risk.”). 
28 See, e.g., id. at 36 (noting that judgmental underwriting “offers opportunities for discriminatory 
behavior”).   
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racial minorities.29  In spite of these problems, the practice has several 
distinct advantages that legislators should consider in assessing the threat 
of financial history discrimination in the employment setting.  First, it 
would reduce the likelihood of implicit bias and stereotyping that 
psychological research demonstrates is inherent in employers’ current 
subjective analyses of the raw data in consumer reports.  Because 
employers would be required to commit to those criteria by which they 
measure an applicant’s employment “risk,” an empirical approach can 
increase consistency and reduce the likelihood that employers would 
deviate—consciously or unconsciously—from the statistically validated 
results generated by an employment scoring algorithm. 
Most importantly, adoption of an employment scoring system can 
address the most compelling criticism of employers’ current evaluation 
methods: there exists inadequate evidence establishing a correlation 
between applicants’ credit history and traits relevant to job performance.  
As I discuss in my earlier article on the normative implications of 
employers’ use of credit reports, existing research fails to persuasively 
establish that financial histories are, in fact, predictive of behaviors 
important to success in the workplace.30  A statistical scoring method 
would help ensure that employers consider only those credit history 
variables that are correlated at a statistically significant level with 
observable, discrete traits, like conscientiousness and responsibility.31 
A statistical approach, at first blush, seems to conflict with the goals of 
antidiscrimination law, since it promotes, rather than restricts, access to a 
controversial source of data.  Many efforts to reduce the risk of 
discrimination in the employment setting have attempted to deprive 
decision-makers of certain types of information.32  This Article argues, 
however, that to the extent suppression of information is impracticable, an 
empirical method may be a more realistic way to advance key anti-
discriminatory objectives.  
                                                                                                                          
29 In other words, because minorities and other protected groups have lower credit scores than 
non-minorities, an employment scoring model—which would likely incorporate some of the same 
credit scoring variables—could have a “disparate impact” on racial minorities, a violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See infra Part V.B.3. 
30 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 171118 (discussing the merits, or lack thereof, of the Fraud 
Hypothesis and Responsibility Hypothesis). 
31 See infra Part V.B.1. 
32 See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination 
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1416 (2000) (describing how American orchestras have required 
auditioning musicians to play behind opaque screens to reduce sex discrimination); Employer Access to 
Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx 
(last updated Sept. 12, 2013) (reporting that thirty-six states are considering adopting legislation that 
would prevent employers from requesting passwords to personal Internet accounts). 
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This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part II describes employers’ 
rationales for consulting applicants’ credit reports and summarizes the 
normative complications posed by this practice.33  Part III discusses the 
limitations of states’ predominant approach to the risk of financial history 
discrimination:  banning employers’ consideration of credit histories.  Part 
IV explores the benefits of giving consumers a greater voice in employers’ 
assessment processes.  Finally, Part V evaluates the merits of an alternative 
solution:  encouraging employers to adopt a statistical method of 
evaluating applicants, analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores and 
insurers’ use of credit-based insurance scores.  While employment 
screening methods have long been a subject of focus in the academic 
literature,34 this Article contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on the 
effects of “Big Data” on the future of antidiscrimination policy.35   
This Article acknowledges that an endorsement of an empirical 
decision-making process rests on completely different normative 
assumptions from those underlying states’ attempts to ban the use of 
financial history information in the employment setting.  Bans on the use 
of credit reports and other financial history information presume that 
employers’ consultation of credit reports either cannot achieve its 
predictive objective, or that the merits of the practice are outweighed by 
important countervailing considerations.  The adoption of a statistical 
                                                                                                                          
33 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 172238 (noting that serious complications include continuing 
racial inequality, social immobility, and the suppression of wages). 
34 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Elinor P. Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 
59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 100304 (1981) (investigating the problems related to employment 
discrimination that occur when employers adopt “novel risk-oriented hiring screens”); Stewart Schwab, 
Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228, 233 (1986) (arguing that statistical 
discrimination may not be very efficient); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial 
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1619 (1991) 
(discussing whether changes in society’s view of race should affect understanding of federal 
employment discrimination laws); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting 
Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1409 (1979) 
(examining “the tangled objections and ambivalent reactions to particular prediction methods, and to 
the process of” predicting an applicant’s future behavior); Nathan J. Ebnet, Note, It Can Do More than 
Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-Employment Screening with the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 306, 30809 (2012) (arguing “that FCRA compliant third-party social 
media screening appropriately balances the privacy interests of job applicants with the information 
appetite of employers,” and recommending “that all social media screening should be formalized”). 
35 See, e.g., SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 
26–27 (David Lyon ed., 2003) (describing the potential for harm when individuals’ personal 
information is used to sort them into categories); Jerry Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA 
L. REV. 809, 847 (2012) (recommending the creation of a new profession of Privacy Data Guardians 
who would manage Privacy Data Vaults); Peppet, supra note 15, at 115356 (listing and then 
discussing the impact of technology on individuals’ lives, including the availability of a service that 
allows individuals to “digitally divulge pre-verified information” to potential employers); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1667, 166870 (2008) (examining the changes in information economics and suggesting that the 
law should respond to those changes). 
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evaluation method, in contrast, presumes the precise opposite: credit 
reports can, in fact, be used to predict counterproductive work behaviors, 
and the merits of the practice are not overshadowed by political or ethical 
complications.  This Article does not claim to reconcile this tension or to 
resolve these normative uncertainties.   
The dilemma this Article explores is different.  This Article argues that 
legislative efforts to restrict the use of credit reporting information may 
fail, regardless of whether financial histories are a valid measurement of 
important personality traits, and regardless of whether countervailing 
normative considerations justify the suppression of this information.  Thus, 
this Article considers the information-management tensions that legislators 
must address in the nascent “Big Data” economy.  It attempts to elucidate 
the benefits and drawbacks of a variety of prescriptive solutions to the risk 
of financial history discrimination, given the acute risk that what may be 
perceived as the most robust and risk-averse solution cannot in practice 
provide the antidiscrimination protection that advocates seek.  This 
analysis does not reflect a normative concession, so much as a pragmatic 
recognition that laws often do not achieve their desired objectives and that 
policymakers must frequently act in spite of normative ambiguity. 
II.  THE INCREASE IN “OFF-LABEL” USE OF CREDIT REPORTS BY 
EMPLOYERS, INSURERS, AND LICENSING ORGANIZATIONS 
The most common and traditional use of credit reports has been by 
creditors, who consult these databases to decide whether applicants are 
qualified for mortgages, credit cards, and other credit products.36  Credit 
reports reduce the information asymmetries between consumers and 
creditors by allowing creditors to assess an otherwise anonymous 
consumer’s “creditworthiness” and to price credit products accordingly.37  
Creditors’ longstanding use of credit reports is an example of the nation’s 
increasing reliance on “Big Data”—an evolution in data aggregation and 
assimilation that is changing the way economic actors process and respond 
to information.38 
                                                                                                                          
36 See Loretta J. Mester, What’s the Point of Credit Scoring?, BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 3, 
34 (providing background information on what credit scoring is and describing its primary use in 
helping lenders make better informed decisions).  
37 Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in America 
4–5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 02-21, 2002), available at 
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wp02-21.pdf. 
38 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 686 (2013) (“Data aggregation, 
analysis, retrieval, and transmission by computers on grand scales, collectively and colloquially 
referred to as Big Data, are changing the way we process information, what we learn from that 
information, and how we behave based on that information.”).  
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Consumer reports contain abundant information about every American 
adult’s personal and financial background.39  Reports list an individual’s 
(1) personal information (e.g., address and employment history);40 (2) 
payment history (i.e., record of loan repayment);41 (3) inquiry history (i.e., 
a list of those who have recently accessed a consumer’s report);42 and 
(4) public record information (e.g., bankruptcies and foreclosures).43  
Credit reporting agencies—more commonly known as “credit bureaus”44—
use these raw data to generate an applicant’s “credit score”—a 
quantification of the credit risk posed by a prospective or current 
borrower.45  
Over the last several decades, however, credit reports have 
increasingly been used for many “off-label” purposes.46  Today, insurers, 
employers, landlords, and licensing organizations regularly access 
individuals’ credit histories.47  Unlike creditors, these entities generally use 
credit data to make inferences not about these individuals’ likelihood of 
repaying particular debts,48 but about their personal behaviors and 
propensities.49  Insurers, for example, use credit histories to generate 
credit-based insurance scores, which they in turn use as a factor in 
                                                                                                                          
39 ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 4.1, at 
83 (5th ed. 2002) (“The three major agencies will have a file on virtually every adult American . . . .”).   
40 Personal information includes a consumer’s name, address, Social Security number, date of 
birth, previous address, employer, and phone number.  EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES & CREDIT 
REPORTS: HOW THE SYSTEM REALLY WORKS: WHAT YOU CAN DO 81–82 (2d ed. 2005). 
41 Payment history details a consumer’s record of repayment on her mortgage, auto loans, 
installment loans, credit cards, and department store cards.  Id. at 19. 
42 “Inquiries” refer to those employers and creditors who have requested a consumer’s credit 
report within the last two years for employment purposes and within the last year for any other purpose.  
CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 
§ 3.2.3.2, at 75 (7th ed. 2010). 
43 Public record information includes tax liens, bankruptcies, court judgments, and foreclosures.  
Id. 
44 The term “consumer reporting agency” is broader than the term “credit bureau.”  A consumer 
reporting agency encompasses “credit bureaus” and other entities that do not specialize in reporting 
consumer credit information to prospective creditors.  Id. § 1.2.1, at 4.  “Consumer reporting agencies” 
include tenant screening bureaus and employment screening agencies.  Id. 
45 FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at S-1. 
46 See Katie Porter, More Supreme Court Action on Credit Issues, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 28, 2006) 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/09/more_supreme_co.html (discussing how insurance 
companies use credit reports to make underwriting decisions). 
47 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1696, 170506 (providing examples of non-credit uses of 
consumer reports). 
48 E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON 
CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 2 (2007) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
INSURANCE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-
Based_Insurance_Scores.pdf (explaining that insurers do not use credit-based insurance scores to 
predict payment behavior, such as whether premiums will be paid).   
49 Landlords may, however, use credit reports in part to determine if a prospective tenant is 
financially stable.  Trinise L. Castro, What Do Landlords Look for on a Credit Check?, SFGATE.COM, 
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/landlords-look-credit-check-2732.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
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estimating the number or total cost of insurance claims that prospective 
policyholders may file.50  Likewise, some licensing organizations attempt 
to infer from credit reports whether prospective licensees are likely to 
exhibit self-restraint and observe the law.  For example, a state bar 
examiner might attempt to deduce whether an applicant who has 
significant student loan debt and who is the subject of numerous collection 
actions is likely to steal a client’s property.51 
It is now standard practice for employers to consult applicants’ credit 
histories in making hiring decisions.  Employer surveys indicate that sixty 
percent of employers used credit reports in 2010, compared to thirty-five 
percent of employers in 2003, and nineteen percent in 1996.52  Employers 
and licensing organizations use applicants’ consumer reports for two 
primary reasons: (1) to predict whether an applicant is likely to steal from 
customers, co-workers, or clients (which I refer to as the “Fraud 
Hypothesis”); and (2) to measure an applicant’s level of financial 
responsibility, which employers in turn interpret as an indication of his or 
her capacity to serve as a responsible employee or licensee (which I refer 
to as the “Responsibility Hypothesis”).53   
Significantly, employers do not have access to the credit scores 
generated by credit reporting agencies.54  Because credit reporting agencies 
use credit scoring algorithms for specific credit-related purposes (to 
predict, for example, an applicant’s likelihood of repaying a thirty-year 
fixed mortgage), credit reporting agencies refuse to provide employers 
with credit scores, which are not necessarily reflective of the risks posed 
by a job applicant.55  Instead, employers—like licensing organizations—
                                                                                                                          
50 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSURANCE, supra note 48, at 2. 
51 See Lori E. Shaw, What Does It Take to Satisfy Character and Fitness Requirements?, 37 
STUDENT L. 12, 14 (2008) (discussing debt as a general issue for bar examiners).  One bar examiner 
articulated this concern as follows: 
I think the concern ultimately centers around the issue of protection of the public.  
Before admitting someone to the bar, I believe that the members of Character and 
Fitness Committees want to be sure that the financial pressures on a new lawyer will 
not be such that the lawyer will be tempted to take advantage of a client . . . . 
Id. 
52 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CREDIT 
BACKGROUND CHECKS SHRM POLL 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings
/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChecking.aspx. 
53 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1711–18 (defining the two hypotheses and describing their use by 
employers). 
54 See Leslie Callaway & Mark Kruhm, Servicemember Disclosure a Must on All Mortgages, 102 
AM. BANKERS ASS’N BANKING J. 64, 64 (2010) (“Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion all decline to 
provide credit scores to employers for employment screening.”). 
55 See id. (explaining that consumer reporting agencies refuse to provide credit reports to 
employers because employers lack a “legitimate business need” for accessing this information).  As I 
have previously argued, however, both credit scores as well as raw credit history data may be 
insufficiently predictive of personality traits that are relevant to workplace performance.  See Shepard, 
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attempt to infer from the raw data on credit reports whether a given 
applicant reflects a good employment “risk.”  For example, an employer 
might presume that a candidate’s spotty repayment history and her recent 
bankruptcy filing predispose her to fraud, absenteeism, or distractedness. 
Employers’ increased interest in consumer reports as a vetting tool has 
been fueled by several factors.  In competitive job markets, when large 
numbers of applicants vie for limited positions, employers seek additional 
ways to sort through applications efficiently.56  Employers can cull large 
numbers of applicants based on the presence of a bankruptcy, a collection 
action, or evidence of excessive debt on a consumer report.57 
Likewise, employers’ use of consumer reports has been fueled by 
prospective and former employers’ fear of tort liability.  Prospective 
employers are concerned that if they fail to carefully consider applicants’ 
backgrounds, then they will expose themselves to negligent hiring 
lawsuits.58  Employers are frequently admonished that failure to conduct a 
thorough background check on a prospective employee—including a credit 
report check—can have serious legal and financial ramifications.59  Those 
who defend employers’ use of credit reports claim, for example, that one-
third of all corporate bankruptcies are a direct result of employee theft—a 
problem that could be averted through a proper background review.60   
                                                                                                                          
supra note 9, at 1707 n.65 (explaining that credit bureaus do not share scores because they are 
“designed specifically for lending and not for other purposes”). 
56 See Desmond, supra note 9, at 90708 (stating that the recent recession has created a job 
market favoring employers and that employers are using credit checks as part of a “pre-employment 
screening” process); Why Filing Bankruptcy Might Be the Worst Thing You Could Do for Your Career, 
supra note 6 (explaining that employers’ use of credit reports “helps companies weed through huge 
application pools with relative quickness”). 
57 Employers claim not to use credit reports to pre-screen job applicants.  See Christine V. 
Walters, Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Statement at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Meeting: Employer Use of Credit History as a Screening Tool (Oct. 20, 2010), available 
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/walter.cfm (citing a survey in which a majority of 
employers reported that they used credit checks selectively at the end of the hiring process—not to 
screen early-stage applicants).  One recruiter, however, recalls the experience differently.  See Trevor 
Hughes, Shaky Credit Reports Could Hurt Job Applicants; Seven State Legislatures Act to Limit Hiring 
Requirement, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2012, at 2B (reporting that companies’ hiring managers would 
request that the recruiter exclude from consideration those applicants who had recently filed for 
bankruptcy). 
58 Shepard, supra note 9, at 172021. 
59 See Tom Ahearn, Avoiding Negligent Hiring with Background Checks Explained in Interactive 
Webinar on February 6, EMP. SCREENING RES. (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2013/01/28/avoiding-negligent-hiring-with-background-checks-
explained-in-interactive-webinar-on-february-6/ (“Even after the most diligent candidate selection 
process, hiring someone without conducting a thorough background check can lead to major legal and 
financial ramifications for a company.  If new hires are dishonest about education, employment or 
criminal history, employers could face the burden of having unqualified workers or even violent 
employees in their offices.” (quoting Lester S. Rosen, Founder and CEO of Employment Screening 
Resources) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
60 “Job Killer” Bill Banning Credit Report Use for Employment Passes Senate Fiscal Committee, 
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Former employers’ concerns about tort exposure may also indirectly 
place pressure on prospective employers to consult applicants’ credit 
reports.  Prospective employers frequently seek background information 
about a job applicant by contacting the applicant’s references—a 
seemingly high quality source of information about an applicant’s 
performance in previous positions.  Because, however, former employers 
are fearful of defamation suits, they are frequently reluctant to make candid 
evaluations of previous employees.61  Instead, many previous employers 
provide only cursory and superficial assessments.62  Thus, because 
prospective employers may be unable to acquire more relevant information 
from applicants’ references, they feel forced to resort to less accurate, but 
more easily accessible, information.63  Employers, for example, may more 
readily consult consumer reports, Facebook profiles, and other websites 
revealed in Google searches.64  This development is consistent with 
screening theory, which posits that if a “desired characteristic is 
unobservable, an uninformed party will filter counterparties based on what 
observable characteristics or information is available.”65   
Finally, as I discuss below, credit reports have grown more appealing 
to employers as a result of developments in consumer protection laws and 
advances in information technology.66  Both have increased consumers’ 
access to and control over the information in their reports, thereby 
increasing credit reports’ real or perceived accuracy.67  Although consumer 
                                                                                                                          
CALCHAMBER (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/08172011-
jobkillerbillbanningcreditreportuseforemploymentpassessenatefiscalcommittee.aspx (“The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce estimates that a third of all corporate bankruptcies are a direct result of 
employee theft.  Accordingly, all employers need the ability to obtain and review the objective 
information provided in an employee credit report . . . .”). 
61 See, e.g., Natalie A. Simon, Long-Term Care at Home: Employing Caregivers, in 1 ESTATE 
PLANNING FOR THE AGING OR INCAPACITATED CLIENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 10-1, 10-3 (Donald N. 
Freedman & Emily S. Starr eds., 2012) (explaining that prospective employers cannot trust most 
references, since former employers—fearful of defamation or breach of privacy suits—are likely to 
provide only a perfunctory assessment and may even conceal negative information about the former 
employee). 
62 Id. 
63 See id. (explaining that, absent reliable references, prospective employers must resort to 
publicly available information about the job applicant, credit checks, and other sources).  
64 See Thirty-Seven Percent of Companies Use Social Networks to Research Potential Job 
Candidates, According to New CareerBuilder Survey, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/thirty-seven-percent-of-companies-use-social-networks-to-
research-potential-job-candidates-according-to-new-careerbuilder-survey-147885445.html 
(“Employers [who reported using social networking screening] are primarily using Facebook (65 
percent) and LinkedIn (63 percent) to research candidates; 16 percent use Twitter.”). 
65 Peppet, supra note 15, at 1161. 
66 See infra notes 123–29 and accompanying text. 
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit 
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reporting agencies continue to report a significant amount of erroneous 
information,68 consumers’ increased access to their credit reports—coupled 
with laws that allow consumers to correct errors and omissions—have 
substantially shifted the onus of information-verification to consumers.69  
As a result of consumers’ participation in this vetting process, employers 
may feel more comfortable relying on credit histories as evaluative tools. 
In my earlier article, I examine the normative considerations 
underlying employers’ use of credit reports.  I briefly summarize these 
political, ethical, and economic arguments below.  Although this Article’s 
emphasis is on the information-management implications of various policy 
proposals, the utility of these prescriptions can be measured, at least in 
part, by how well they negotiate these competing considerations.  I discuss 
three important normative issues here: (1) the promotion of debt 
repayment; (2) the empirical validity of employers’ use of financial 
histories; and (3) the effect of the practice on racial equality and social 
mobility. 
First, it is possible that employers’ consideration of financial histories 
serves a useful deterrent function.  Debt default—especially bankruptcy—
is perceived by many as an evasion of one’s financial obligations, the costs 
of which are externalized in the form of increased interest rates and a 
decreased availability of credit.70  For this reason, many employers who 
use credit reports as a vetting tool may choose not to hire applicants who 
have filed for bankruptcy or defaulted on a certain type of financial 
obligation.  In this way, employers’ use of credit reports operates as a 
deterrent to debt default—one that supplements existing legal penalties.71  
It is possible that employers’ use of financial histories, by penalizing 
candidates who have failed to repay their debts, serves a salutary economic 
function by encouraging debtors to reconcile with their creditors.72  
Alternatively, however, employers’ and licensing organizations’ 
consideration of financial histories may create incentives for applicants to 
                                                                                                                          
. . . in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the . . . accuracy . . . of such 
information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.”). 
68 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR 
AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at i (2012) [hereinafter FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, FACTA], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130211factareport.pdf (reporting that 
twenty-six percent of consumers in a study found one or more “potentially material error[s]” on at least 
one of their credit reports). 
69 See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
70 See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 171 (2005) (“Voluntary creditors presumably pass most, if not all, of 
[the initial burden of bankruptcy relief] along to current or future debtors in the form of higher interest 
rates.  To the extent that they do, the effect of bankruptcy protection is to increase the cost of credit to 
individuals and/or reduce its availability in the economy in general.”). 
71 Shepard, supra note 9, at 1723. 
72 Id. at 1727. 
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reduce their productivity levels, which can trigger costs borne by 
taxpayers, dependents, and others.73 
Second, many who question the wisdom and ethics of employers’ use 
of credit reports contend that the practice lacks empirical support.74  In 
other words, it is unclear whether or to what extent credit reports are, in 
fact, predictive of personality traits relevant to job performance.  I have 
previously argued that there is little to no evidence to support the Fraud 
Hypothesis and only limited evidence to support the Responsibility 
Hypothesis.75  For instance, many of the studies that have been used to 
justify the Fraud Hypothesis employ flawed methodologies.  These studies 
report that individuals who have committed financial crimes have 
experienced financial stress.76  Because, however, it is unclear what 
percentage of all employees experiencing financial stress refrain from 
committing theft or fraud, these studies do not establish a general 
correlation between financial stress and propensity to commit financial 
crimes.77  In other words, researchers lack a representative sample of 
employees or job applicants.  
While additional studies attempt to assess the relationship between 
financial history and counterproductive work behaviors, none persuasively 
demonstrate a correlation between the two variables.78  For example, in 
attempting to measure the correlation between certain negative work habits 
and adverse financial histories, many studies have relied on self-reported 
data,79 which may or may not be reflective of an applicant’s credit history 
as interpreted by an employer.80  Studies that rely on applicants’ credit 
scores are likewise problematic, since employers do not use credit scores in 
                                                                                                                          
73 Id. at 1727–28. 
74 See, e.g., Jeremy B. Bernerth et al., An Empirical Investigation of Dispositional Antecedents 
and Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores, 97 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 469, 469 (2012) 
(“Despite the claims of practitioners and credit reporting agencies, there exists virtually no empirical 
evidence to confirm or refute the proposed antecedents and outcomes of credit scores.  Such a lack of 
evidence presents a problem for organizations using credit scores to screen employees . . . .”). 
75 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1711–18 (discussing the evidence supporting the two hypotheses). 
76 ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM., REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND 
ABUSE 5 (2010), available at http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/r
ttn-2010.pdf (reporting that in forty-three percent of occupational fraud cases studied, perpetrators were 
“living beyond their means,” and in thirty-six percent of these cases, perpetrators were experiencing 
financial difficulties).  
77 Shepard, supra note 9, at 1713. 
78 Id. 
79 See, e.g., Edward S. Oppler et al., The Relationship Between Financial History and 
Counterproductive Work Behavior, 16 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 417 (2008) (relying on a 
questionnaire in which job applicants self-report certain adverse financial events). 
80 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1716 (“[Employers] have access only to specific lists of financial 
events . . . . As a result, employers might process these raw data very differently (and far less 
consistently) than do consumer reporting agencies’ algorithms.”). 
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their evaluation processes.81  As a result, these studies’ outcomes are not 
necessarily applicable to real-world uses of credit reports by employers.   
Even if employers’ use of credit reports lacks empirical support, 
however, some might question why, in effect, employers should bear the 
onus of establishing the practice’s predictive validity.  Under this view, 
applicants—and not employers—should bear the burden of proving that 
credit reports do not predict one’s likelihood of serving as a responsible 
employee or engaging in fraud or theft.  Absent evidence negating the 
practice’s validity, and absent successful Title VII challenges, employers 
arguably should have the right to consider all facially relevant information.   
Third, many contend that, even if credit reports can validly and reliably 
predict a prospective employee’s merits, the benefits of employers’ use of 
credit reports are outweighed by important countervailing considerations.  
Specifically, the use of credit reports in the employment setting may have a 
deleterious impact on racial and economic equality.82   
Although the practice is facially neutral and appears to affect all 
applicants even-handedly, employers’ use of credit reports likely has a 
disparate impact on racial minorities.83  Because there is a strong 
correlation between race and credit score,84 the practice may perpetuate 
discrimination by reinforcing racial disparities in the allocation of jobs—
resources that are indispensable to an individual’s identity, personal 
dignity, and financial independence.85 
Relatedly, many have expressed concern that the use of credit histories 
can adversely affect social mobility.86  Because income and credit history 
are positively correlated, employers who scrutinize applicants’ financial 
backgrounds may be unwittingly impairing poorer individuals’ ability to 
ascend to positions of higher status and wealth.87  Similarly, because 
applicants with adverse financial histories suffer a competitive 
disadvantage in the hiring process, the practice may place downward 
pressure on poorer applicants’ wages, thereby perpetuating income 
disparities.88  The practice may also present a more symbolic challenge to 
social mobility by signaling to consumers that their financial decisions 
                                                                                                                          
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 1729–33 (discussing the disparities between the credit scores of minorities and non-
minorities and the impact on minorities when employers make hiring decisions based in part on the 
financial histories of applicants). 
83 Id. at 1730. 
84 Id. at 1730–31. 
85 See id. at 1700 (noting that philosopher Anthony Appiah described the pursuit of a career as “a 
resource that [is] . . . ‘essential to a dignified autonomous life’” (quoting K. Anthony Appiah, 
Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 41, 46 (2000))). 
86 See id. at 1734–38 (“[E]mployers’ and licensing organizations’ use of financial histories 
[prompts concerns] that the practice poses an affront to social mobility.”). 
87 Id. at 1734–35. 
88 Id. at 1735–36. 
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have serious collateral ramifications—ones that extend far beyond the 
realm of access to and cost of credit.89  Employers’ use of credit reports 
teaches consumers that late payments or debt-collection actions can result 
in far more than a mere increase in a consumer’s interest rate or the 
imposition of various fees.  Significantly, these adverse financial events 
can complicate a consumer’s pursuit of a job or a profession.90 
In the next Part, I examine how legislators have overwhelmingly 
responded to these normative and empirical uncertainties: by attempting to 
ban employers’ use of credit reports in the evaluation process.  While this 
approach may appear especially politically palatable in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession, and while it seemingly reflects the most risk-averse 
solution, I argue that suppression of information may be infeasible in a 
society and era in which data aggregation and dissemination pose 
unprecedented challenges to consumer privacy and to antidiscrimination 
policy. 
III.  STATES’ PREVAILING RESPONSE TO THE RISK OF  
FINANCIAL HISTORY DISCRIMINATION:  INQUIRY LIMITS 
Legislators’ primary response to the risk of financial history 
discrimination has been to restrict employers’ inquiry into and use of 
applicants’ credit history.91  Currently, eight states—California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington—and several major cities have passed laws restricting 
employers’ use of consumer reports.92  Other states are considering similar 
legislation.93   
Conceptually, inquiry limits may provide the most politically palatable 
and logical response to many normative concerns about employers’ use of 
financial histories in the hiring process.  Because of the empirical 
uncertainty about credit reports’ ability to validly predict either 
                                                                                                                          
89 See id. at 1736–38 (“It is also possible that the practice’s most direct affront to social mobility 
stems from its deterrent and symbolic role, suggesting that the goals of debt repayment and social 
mobility are in tension with one another.”). 
90 See id. at 1759 (noting that a stronger antidiscrimination rule “can reduce those barriers that 
may inevitably complicate the search for a new job or career”). 
91 See id. at 1697–98 (“Legislators and policymakers have questioned the logic and ethics of 
employers’ and licensing organizations’ two primary uses of financial histories . . . . Some federal and 
state legislators have sought to limit employers’ consideration of applicants’ credit histories absent a 
reasonably clear relationship between the applicant’s financial transgression and his or her ability to 
perform the responsibilities demanded by the position.”). 
92 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  Bans are also either in effect or are being considered 
in Chicago, Illinois; Hartford, Connecticut; New York, New York; and Washington, D.C.  CHI., ILL. 
MUN. CODE § 2-160-053 (2012); HARTFORD, CONN. MUN. CODE § 2-346 (2013); N.Y. CITY COUNCIL 
INT. NO. 0857-2012 (as laid over by the Comm. on Civ. Rights, Apr. 11, 2013); WASH. D.C., H.R. 645 
(as presented to the House Fin. Servs. Comm. on Feb. 13, 2013). 
93 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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counterproductive work behaviors or applicants’ propensity to commit 
fraud or theft,94 suspension of the practice may be warranted.  Although 
this policy response is blunt, it reflects the public’s and policymakers’ 
significant ambivalence about the merits of the practice. 
In the long term, however, inquiry limits may be a suboptimal response 
to the risk that employers will unfairly discriminate against applicants with 
adverse financial histories.  First, in their current form, state laws are 
narrowly drafted and, as a result, make few changes to the status quo.  
Thus, they advance few anti-discriminatory objectives.  Even if, however, 
state laws were drafted more broadly and were vigorously enforced, 
inquiry limits cannot stem the flow of financial history information to 
employers.  As a result, inquiry limits cannot provide a sustained solution 
to the threat of financial history discrimination in the employment setting. 
A.  Current Laws Advance Few Antidiscriminatory Objectives 
A number of state laws restricting employers’ consideration of 
financial history follow a similar template.  The laws prohibit employers 
from using credit reports to evaluate prospective employees95 unless one of 
several exceptions applies.  Employers may consult credit reports when, 
for example, the employer is seeking to fill a position involving: (1) 
managerial responsibility;96 (2) state government employment;97 (3) law 
enforcement;98 (4) access to third parties’ personal or financial information 
(e.g., social security numbers or credit card account information);99 (5) the 
exercise of fiduciary responsibility (e.g., the power to issue payments, 
collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts);100 (6) access to 
confidential or proprietary information, including trade secrets;101 or (7) 
access to cash.102  
In their current form, these laws do not substantially change the status 
quo or advance many normative goals articulated by legislators.  First, the 
                                                                                                                          
94 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
95 These state laws also generally prohibit employers from using credit reports to evaluate current 
employees for promotion or retention.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(b)(1) (2012) (“An 
employer shall not: (1) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit; discharge; or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment 
because of the individual’s credit report or credit history.”).  The focus of this Article, however, is on 
employers’ use of credit reports to evaluate those seeking to obtain a new job or enter a particular 
profession. 
96 See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b)(4) (West Supp. 2013). 
97 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013). 
98 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(c)(A)–(C) (2011). 
99 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51tt(a)(4)(B) (2013). 
100 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).  
101 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(7) (West Supp. 2013). 
102 See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b)(2) (West Supp. 2013) (permitting employers to 
check a candidate’s credit history when the candidate would have access to more than $2,500 in cash). 
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carveouts in the state statutes can be interpreted to encompass a large 
percentage of jobs.103  In this way, state laws that restrict an employers’ use 
of consumer reports merely codify existing Title VII disparate impact 
jurisprudence.104  The bans prevent employers from using credit reports—a 
practice that many have argued results in a disparate impact on protected 
groups105—unless employers can establish that the practice is consistent 
with business necessity.  Just as courts have broadly interpreted “business 
necessity” in plaintiffs’ Title VII challenges to employers’ consultation of 
financial histories,106 state legislators have exempted broad categories of 
jobs from the credit reporting restriction.   
Second, in addition to the exemptions already in place, all of the state 
laws (rather hypocritically) authorize employers to consider applicants’ 
credit reports when existing federal or state laws so require.107  As a result, 
restrictions on credit report use can be easily circumvented.  
Finally, these laws may be unable to effectively restrict employers’ 
access to financial history information, since the majority of these bans 
attempt to suppress employers’ access to credit reports specifically, rather 
than impose a general ban on employers’ access to all sources of financial 
history information.108  Although credit reports are usually the primary 
source from which employers learn about applicants’ financial histories, 
employers may learn about applicants’ financial background through other 
means.  For example, information about bankruptcies, mortgage liens, 
foreclosures, and tax liens appears in the public records.109  This adverse 
                                                                                                                          
103 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1714 (citing the broad interpretation of exempt categories in state 
statutes). 
104 See id. at 1766 (discussing state laws’ function of “entrench[ing] prevailing stereotypes” and 
the legitimization of employer’s rights to access financial histories). 
105 See, e.g., TRAUB, supra note 10, at Executive Summary (arguing that people of color are more 
likely than others to report poor credit). 
106 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. United Va. Bank, No. 75-166-N, 1977 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13687, at *39 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977) (holding that a bank appropriately conducted 
preemployment credit checks, since “the banking business is a fiduciary business . . . where there is a 
good deal of cash openly handled”), aff’d, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980); Bailey v. DeBard, No. IP 74–
458–C, 1975 WL 227, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 31, 1975) (holding that a state police department was 
justified in using character investigations and credit checks to screen prospective police officers, since a 
poor financial history might render police officers more vulnerable to the “criminal element”). 
107 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting employers 
from discriminating against an individual who has opposed a forbidden practice in which the employer 
has engaged); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 2012) (exempting employers from 
prohibitions on credit history reports if federal or state law requires the reports). 
108 For example, California’s law prohibits employers or prospective employers from consulting 
applicants’ “consumer credit report” for employment purposes.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (West 
Supp. 2013).  It defines “[c]onsumer credit report” as a communication by a consumer credit reporting 
agency of credit worthiness.  Id. § 1024.5(c)(1). 
109 See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 3.2.3.2, at 75 (discussing the location of the public 
record information in consumer files); see also 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012) (indicating that documents 
filed in a bankruptcy case are public records).  A court can seal bankruptcy documents containing trade 
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information may also be revealed in local newspapers110 or via Google 
searches, since some third-party websites include references to the public 
records.111  Even search engines’ “autocomplete” functions may suggest—
correctly or incorrectly—that an applicant has filed for bankruptcy.112  An 
employer might also learn about a job applicant’s bankruptcy or past-due 
debts from the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship between the 
employer and the applicant.113  In short, financial history information—like 
other forms of personal information—has the capacity to infiltrate these 
porous, legislatively-erected barriers. 
These defects are a product of political compromises and narrow 
drafting, but they may be correctible.  For example, the laws could be 
amended to encompass a larger array of positions and sources of financial 
history information.  In addition, legislators could increase these laws’ 
deterrent effect by providing applicants with a private right of action, 
although it would be difficult for applicants to detect and prove violations.  
Even if these laws were increased in breadth, however, the unraveling 
problem, as I discuss below, poses a more serious challenge to states’ 
enforcement of financial history information bans. 
B.  A More Intractable Problem:  The Risk of Game Theoretic Unraveling 
Even if state bans were drafted more broadly to encompass a larger 
percentage of jobs and more sources of financial history information, 
attempts to restrict employers’ use of consumer reports face a more 
intractable problem.  Because the bans cannot prevent individuals from 
voluntarily revealing their own financial history information, the bans may 
trigger an “unraveling” of privacy. 
                                                                                                                          
secrets, defamatory information, or confidential information.  Id. § 107(b)(1)–(2).  Courts have only 
sealed records in cases in which “‘the interest in secrecy outweighs the presumption’ in favor of 
access.”  In re Cont’l Airlines v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 150 B.R. 334, 340 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) 
(quoting In re Revco D.S., Inc., 1990 WL 269887, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1990)).  
110 If I File Bankruptcy, Will My Name Be in the Newspaper?, BRETT NASON: ATT’Y AT L., 
http://nasonlawfirm.com/archives/618 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (explaining that local newspapers 
could print the names of consumer bankruptcy filers).   
111 See, e.g., Ryan C. Wood, If I File Bankruptcy Will Everyone Find Out?, BAY AREA BANKR. 
BUZZ, http://www.westcoastbk.com/blog/2012/02/if-i-file-bankruptcy-will-everyone-find-out/org (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2013) (describing how Section 341 meetings of creditors may be disclosed by search 
engines); DIRTSEARCH.ORG, http://www.dirtsearch.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (offering “One Stop 
Free Public Records & Background Checking”). 
112 Asher Moses, Australian Surgeon Sues Google over “Bankrupt” Auto-Complete, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/australian-
surgeon-sues-google-over-bankrupt-autocomplete-20130122-2d480.html.  
113 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1720 n.143 (citing In re Majewski, 310 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2002) 
as an example of a hospital employee who was fired after he defaulted on his debts owed to the 
hospital).  Although In re Majewski addressed the firing of an existing employee rather than a refusal to 
hire a new employee, an adverse financial history can conceivably reduce one’s appeal to employers at 
any stage of the employment relationship.  
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As Douglas Baird and Scott Peppet have argued, in situations where 
asymmetric information exists between two parties, an individual who 
holds favorable verifiable information has an incentive to reveal that 
information to the uninformed party.114  In the employment setting, those 
with the strongest financial histories—those that reflect no adverse events 
like bankruptcy filings or debt-collection actions—will likely reveal their 
financial history information to employers in order to gain a competitive 
advantage.115  Because many employers regard financial history problems 
as a reflection of irresponsibility or propensity to commit theft, an 
applicant who discloses her strong financial history is more likely 
(particularly in a lean job market) to secure a position and to command a 
higher salary.116 
If self-interested actors disclose their financial history information for 
personal or economic gain, other applicants—including those with less 
favorable financial histories—will in turn be compelled to make similar 
disclosures, since those who fail to disclose will be penalized.117  If an 
applicant fails to reveal her credit score or credit history, an employer will 
infer that the applicant is withholding negative information.118  Faced with 
the choice between disclosure and the stigma associated with failure to 
disclose, an applicant will likely choose to reveal her financial history.  
This chain of events is what scholars have referred to as “unraveling.”119 
Evidence of unraveling is longstanding in the credit reporting context.  
For decades, credit reporting agencies have collected and sorted 
individuals’ personal financial information and made it easily accessible to 
employers, insurers, and creditors.  Employers, however, are subject to an 
important inquiry restriction:  they must secure applicants’ permission to 
access consumer reports.120  Notwithstanding this limitation, job candidates 
readily grant employers permission to view candidates’ reports,121 as 
                                                                                                                          
114 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 15, at 91 (“Because the person who holds favorable verifiable 
information has an incentive to reveal it, the allocation of the right or duty to inquire or disclose should 
not affect whether verifiable information is revealed.”). 
115 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1177 (“Simple self-interest will drive self-disclosure by those 
with favorable private information.”). 
116 See Glenn Curtis, Why Bad Credit Is Bad for Financial Careers, INVESTOPEDIA (May 27, 
2012), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financialcareers/07/broker_credit.asp (discussing four 
reasons why poor credit history may negatively impact a job applicant). 
117 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1177 (“As signaling becomes more pervasive . . . disclosure may 
become the norm across the economy.  Keeping one’s personal prospectus private may become 
suspect.”).  
118 See id. at 1176–77 (discussing why someone with an adverse financial history may feel 
compelled to disclose this information). 
119 See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 15, at 91 (discussing the principle of unraveling). 
120 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
121 See Desmond, supra note 9, at 909 (“[J]ob seekers and employees have little real choice about 
whether or not to allow employers to obtain credit reports.”). 
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failure to disclose this information may foreclose or complicate applicants’ 
pursuit of business and employment opportunities.122 
I argue that as a result of two developments, the potential for 
unraveling in the employment setting is growing more acute.  First, 
consumer-protection laws have gradually provided individuals with 
increased access to the information in their credit reports, a shift that has 
rendered financial history information more transferrable.  Second, credit 
reporting information has grown more accurate.  I discuss each 
development in turn. 
In 1970, in response to concerns that creditors, insurers, and employers 
were using credit reporting information to make consequential, ex parte 
decisions about consumers, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA).123  The FCRA provided consumers with a window into a 
previously secretive, enigmatic credit reporting industry.124  As a result of 
requirements imposed on credit reporting agencies, the contents of credit 
reports—previously inaccessible to consumers—have become increasingly 
transparent.  For example, under the FCRA, consumers may request a copy 
of their credit reports at any time and for any reason.125  In addition, 
consumers who have suffered an adverse action (e.g., a denial of credit) by 
an employer, insurer, or creditor are entitled to a free copy of their 
report.126 
In 2003, Congress expanded consumers’ right of access to their credit 
reporting information.  The FACTA amendments to the FCRA gave 
consumers the right to request a free annual copy of their consumer report 
from each of the three nationwide credit reporting agencies.127  Consumers 
now can easily scrutinize their credit reports free of charge at 
annualcreditreport.com, a website established by the Federal Trade 
Commission.128  In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Congress further increased the transparency of 
                                                                                                                          
122 Shepard, supra note 9, at 1748 (“An applicant who refuses to submit to a financial history 
screening likely effectively removes him or herself from consideration for the position . . . . The 
contract is functionally adhesive.  An individual’s choice is to ‘take or leave’ the employer’s terms—
and, thus, her chance at a job.”); Gallagher, supra note 9, at 1595 (arguing that requiring applicants to 
authorize a credit report check is “virtually meaningless,” since employers can refuse to hire those who 
fail to consent). 
123 Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x); see Shepard, supra note 9, at 1744–46 (discussing Congress’s reasons for passing the FCRA). 
124 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1744–48 (discussing how the FCRA makes the credit reporting 
process more transparent). 
125 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). 
126 Id. § 1681j(b). 
127 Id. § 1681j(a)(1)(A). 
128 See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 3.4.2.1, at 88 (outlining the process by which a 
person can obtain his credit report). 
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creditors’ decision-making processes and mandated that adverse action 
notices include credit scores.129   
Successfully suppressing unraveling in the employment context would 
be challenging because these consumer protection laws have fostered 
consumers’ access to their financial history information.  Even if 
employers were barred from viewing or using individuals’ credit histories, 
consumers would still be expected to vet the contents of their reports for 
credit purposes (for example, before applying for a mortgage).  It would be 
challenging to compartmentalize consumers’ access to their credit 
reporting information, such that consumers are encouraged to access these 
data in one context (credit) but discouraged from using this information in 
another (employment).  
Similarly, as long as legislators authorize the use of credit reports for 
some positions but not others,130 attempts to restrict unraveling might be 
ineffective, since applicants often apply for (or are considered for) more 
than one position.  An applicant could furnish his or her credit report for 
one position, but, based in whole or in part on the strength of that report, 
ultimately be hired for a position for which an employer is barred from 
considering financial histories.   
As Scott Peppet has noted, it is ironic that traditional initiatives to 
increase individuals’ privacy—ones that have sought to provide individuals 
with increased control over their personal information—are in fact 
contributing to an erosion of individual privacy through the unraveling 
process.131  By providing consumers with the “key” to their consumer 
reports, consumer-protection laws have increased the likelihood that 
consumers will very rationally share that key with employers, either to 
(1) capitalize on positive credit histories, or (2) avoid the risk that 
employers will penalize applicants for failing to disclose this 
information.132 
A second change is increasing the likelihood that, notwithstanding a 
ban on employers’ use of credit reports, consumers will disclose their 
financial history information to employers.  Credit reporting information 
has grown not only more accessible (and therefore more transferable), but 
also more accurate.133  
                                                                                                                          
129 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2)(A), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1100F, 124 Stat. 1376, 2112 (2010). 
130 See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. 
131 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1158 (“[I]f individuals have control over their personal 
information, that control is itself the undoing of their privacy.” (emphasis omitted)). 
132 See, e.g., id. at 1158–59 (stating that individuals can be asked to “unlock the door to their 
personal information,” and those who do not will “face new forms of economic discrimination”). 
133 See Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act Promote Accurate 
Credit Reporting? 3 (JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARV. U., 3 BABC 04-14, 2004), available 
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/babc_04-14.pdf (concluding that it would 
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Disclosure of personal information is only valuable to an uninformed 
party to the extent that the information is verifiable.134  Thus, unraveling is 
more likely to occur in situations in which employers can readily verify the 
information that applicants disclose.  Although consumer reporting 
agencies like Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion continue to report a large 
amount of inaccurate information,135 consumer reports’ overall legitimacy 
is increasing, since consumers are now expected to play a greater role in 
verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information in their 
consumer reports.136  The same legal developments that have increased 
consumers’ access to their consumer reports are, in effect, placing pressure 
on consumers to regularly scrutinize their reports for errors and omissions.  
Indeed, the task of verifying the accuracy and completeness of one’s credit 
report is evolving into a routine component of a responsible adult’s 
financial hygiene rituals, much like shredding one’s sensitive financial 
documents, balancing one’s checkbook, or reviewing one’s monthly credit 
card statement for errors. 
A recent Federal Trade Commission study concluded that a significant 
percentage of consumers identified errors on at least one of their three 
credit reports.137  A portion of this group suffered a credit score decrease 
that could affect the price of products like automobile loans and 
automobile insurance.138  The subtitle of the FTC press release, however, 
contained an important reminder and admonition:  “Consumers Should 
Check Their Credit Reports for Free Using AnnualCreditReport.com.”139 
These two developments in credit reporting—increased accessibility 
and increased legitimacy—are reflected in advances in information 
                                                                                                                          
“seem[] highly improbable” that Americans would be able to obtain “1) widespread access to credit 
across the age and income spectrum, 2) relatively low interest rates on secured loans . . . , 3) 
exceptionally broad access to open-end, unsecured credit card products, and 4) relatively low default 
rates across all types of loans” if “the underlying credit reporting system was fraught with serious 
errors”). 
134 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1162 (explaining the costs borne by an economic actor seeking to 
verify information).  
135 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTA, supra note 68, at i (“[W]e find that 26% of the 1,001 
participants in the study [of credit report accuracy] identified at least one potentially material error on 
at least one of their three credit reports.”). 
136 See Zaki, supra note 3 (encouraging young job candidates to maximize their job prospects by 
accessing their credit reports and improving their credit profiles).  The author observes that “[o]nce 
upon a time (when our parents were young), consumers didn’t have such easy access to information 
about their own credit scores.  What’s our excuse, now?”  Id. 
137 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTA, supra note 68, at i. 
138 Id. at v.  
139 In FTC Study, Five Percent of Consumers Had Errors on Their Credit Reports that Could 
Result in Less Favorable Terms for Loans, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/02/creditreport.shtm. 
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technology.140  In recent years, consumers have increasingly begun to 
voluntarily share personal information—including financial history 
information—through new business models and social media devices.  For 
example, Experian Connect, a credit reporting agency service, encourages 
consumers to “[g]rant access [to consumer reports] to the people [they] 
trust—like [their] landlord, [employer,] doctor, lawyer or financial 
adviser.”141  Likewise, job applicants can voluntarily disclose verified 
personal information to prospective employers using services like 
MyBackgroundCheck.com.142  In competitive job markets, some applicants 
have considered listing their favorable credit scores on their resumes.143  In 
light of these trends, it is possible that candidates may eventually share 
their credit scores on Facebook or LinkedIn profiles.  Indeed, one 
company, Credit Sesame, encourages creditworthy individuals to embed a 
financial responsibility “badge” in their email signatures, on social media 
websites, and on personal websites and profiles.144  Applicants could also 
disclose to employers information that they have collected themselves via 
Mint.com, Quicken, smartphone applications, or other financial 
management tools.145 
Thus, from the 1970s to the present, as a result of technological and 
legal developments, credit reports have evolved from depersonalized, 
error-ridden dossiers to more accessible, verifiable, and transferable 
                                                                                                                          
140 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1156 (discussing how “Big Data” developments reduce the 
transaction costs associated with unraveling, since “individuals and firms can extract verified, high-
quality, low-cost data from each other directly rather than searching through [large quantities] of 
unverified, low-quality information”). 
141 See The Benefits of Experian Connect, EXPERIAN, https://connect.experian.com/index.html?ut
m_expid=67468160-63.8ZtNjEX3RNaUrDNeMPACTg.1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (stating that a 
person can “grant access” to anyone they choose); see also Employment and Credit: Employer Access 
to Your Credit Report, EXPERIAN, http://www.experian.com/credit-education/employment.html (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2013) (“Federal law allows potential and current employers to view a modified version 
of your credit report for employment purposes such as hiring and promoting.”). 
142 Peppet, supra note 15, at 1155; Employment Background Checks, MYBACKGROUNDCHECK.CO
M, http://mybackgroundcheck.com/employment_background_checks.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).  
This verification service assures job applicants that “[they are] in control,” because they can “look at 
[their] background check,” “make sure it’s correct,” and “decide what information to share with 
employers.”  Employment Background Checks, supra. 
143 See Samantha Nolan, Revisit Your Résumé to Ensure It Is “Cutting-Edge,” LADYBUG DESIGN 
(Mar. 18, 2012), http://ladybug-design.com/blog/?p=495 (responding to “Dear Sam” letter in which 
older employee asks whether he should include credit score on resume to improve his chances of 
finding a job “in this dire economy”). 
144 Press Release: Credit Sesame, Credit Sesame Launches Web’s First Credit Badge™ Program, 
CREDIT SESAME (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.creditsesame.com/about/press/credit-sesame-launches-
webs-first-credit-badge-program/. 
145 This problem, known as “self-surveillance,” has triggered novel privacy dilemmas.  See 
generally Kang et al., supra note 35, at 812, 823, 847 (recommending the creation of the Personal Data 
Guardian, which would manage Privacy Data Vaults that store self-surveillance data, to counter the 
novel privacy dilemmas created by self-surveillance). 
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records that, as a result of consumers’ vetting processes, appear to bear 
consumers’ imprimatur.146  These developments are decreasing the 
transaction costs associated with unraveling.147 
None of the current bans on employers’ use of consumer reports can 
easily prevent individuals from sharing their personal financial 
information.  Likewise, it would be challenging to redraft the laws to 
prevent unraveling, since prohibitions on individuals’ disclosure of their 
credit reporting information might not withstand constitutional scrutiny.148  
Even if applicants could be barred from sharing consumer reporting 
information directly with employers (or even if employers could be trusted 
not to use any formal credit reporting information), it would be more 
difficult to prevent the disclosure and use of more subtle forms of financial 
history data.  Applicants can “signal” to employers the strength of their 
financial backgrounds without formally revealing their actual credit 
histories.149 
For example, graduates of educational institutions could signal the 
absence of student loan debt (and, therefore, the absence of any student 
loan delinquencies) by disclosing that they received scholarships or other 
subsidies that covered all or the vast majority of their educational 
expenses.  Without considering formal credit histories, employers could 
rely on even more imprecise proxies for financial status, including (1) race 
(minority applicants are more likely to have worse credit histories than are 
non-minority applicants),150 (2) length of time at a particular address (a 
recent move is more likely to indicate that the applicant has been evicted or 
has suffered a foreclosure),151 (3) employment status (applicants who have 
experienced a long period of unemployment are more likely to exhibit 
                                                                                                                          
146 Compare Shepard, supra note 9, at 1744, 1745 (explaining that the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting 
Act was “designed to increase accuracy and privacy in the credit reporting industry” partly because 
“[c]onsumers had [neither] access to their consumer reports” nor the ability to “correct incomplete, 
irrelevant, or obsolete information”), with FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTA, supra note 68, at 2 
(discussing the consolidation of about 200 million consumers “into consumer reports and credit 
reports” which can be analyzed and, thus, “enabl[ing] credit grantors” to quickly make “generally 
reliable decisions” on whether to grant consumers credit). 
147 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1191–92 (discussing how unraveling is limited by transactional 
costs). 
148 See id. at 1198–99 (finding it difficult to overcome the “constitutional and social objections” 
raised to “prohibit individuals from sharing their personal information”). 
149 See id. at 1162 (discussing that borrowers can simply state “I am a good credit risk—I will 
repay my loans” without necessarily proving their credit worthiness as a signal to lenders). 
150 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1730–31 (citing studies on credit scores that reveal disparities 
between minorities and non-minorities). 
151 See, e.g., id. at 1700–01 nn.23 & 26 (stating that consumer reports provide personal 
information such as previous address and public record information including foreclosures).  
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financial problems),152 (4) appearance (expensive clothing or accessories 
might suggest that the applicant does not lack money),153 or 
(5) membership in exclusive organizations (participation in particular 
alumni groups, country clubs, fraternities or sororities, or even religious 
organizations can signal wealth).154  While these criteria can serve as 
signals for other, more obviously legitimate qualifications, they could be 
used to make rough inferences about an applicant’s financial status.  
Although unraveling may not be inevitable, it remains an acute risk in 
an economy and society in which data analysis and aggregation complicate 
traditional information-suppression initiatives.155  For this reason, 
legislators must consider alternative methods to reduce the potential for 
discrimination in the employment setting. 
IV.  INCREASING CONSUMERS’ PARTICIPATORY ROLE  
IN EMPLOYERS’ ASSESSMENT PROCESSES 
Currently, the processes by which employers use applicants’ credit 
histories to make employment decisions is depersonalized and opaque.  
Applicants may be aware that employers are utilizing their credit reports,156 
but have little opportunity to respond to employers’ concerns about 
problems revealed in those reports.  Applicants may be unable to explain to 
employers the complex circumstances that may have contributed to, for 
example, a bankruptcy filing or a debt-collection action.  Thus, as an 
alternative to limiting employers’ inquiry into applicants’ credit history, 
policymakers could take a more nuanced approach and mandate that 
employers provide applicants with a greater participatory role in 
employers’ assessment processes.   
In this Part, I first evaluate employers’ ad hoc, informal attempts to 
provide applicants with a greater voice in their evaluation processes: 
                                                                                                                          
152 See Knafo, supra note 12 (describing the “vicious cycle of debt and unemployment” in which 
a bad credit report keeps a person unemployed, causing the person to incur greater debt during the 
unemployment). 
153 Expensive clothing or accessories could instead suggest profligacy, however. 
154 Although there exists a correlation between income and credit history, the correlation is 
imperfect.  Compare Fumiko Hayashi & Joanna Stavins, Effects of Credit Scores on Consumer 
Payment Choice 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-1, 2012), 
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1201.pdf (“Older consumers and higher-
income earners tend to have a higher credit score.”), with Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How 
Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2009) (“Credit scores do 
not exactly correlate with income, in that high-income borrowers may have low credit scores, and vice 
versa, depending on their payment histories.”). 
155 See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1176–77 (defining the “unraveling threat to privacy” concept as 
the pervasiveness of signaling, creating circumstances in which people must disclose private 
information to “avoid the stigma of keeping information secret”). 
156 Before accessing an applicant’s credit report, an employer must clearly disclose that it has the 
right to obtain a report for employment purposes.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
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employers’ current practice of providing certain applicants with the 
opportunity to “explain” what factors contributed to their adverse financial 
statuses (a right that I refer to as the “Mitigation Opportunity”).  I then 
consider how the Mitigation Opportunity could be formalized and 
expanded, consistent with analogous rights consumers enjoy (1) under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act and (2) in the insurance scoring context. 
A. Employers’ Current Practice:  An Informal, Ad Hoc Mitigation 
Opportunity 
Currently, some employers claim to provide select applicants with the 
opportunity to “explain” adverse information in their consumer reports.157  
As part of this “Mitigation Opportunity,” these employers claim to give 
applicants a chance to describe what factors caused their financial 
problems.  These employers maintain that they take a more forgiving view 
of financial problems triggered by divorces, separations, job layoffs, and 
medical problems.158  In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, many 
employers also claim to discount foreclosures.159 
The Mitigation Opportunity seemingly allows employers to provide, at 
least in limited cases, an individualized approach to an otherwise 
bureaucratic and impersonal assessment method.160  By giving applicants a 
chance to describe what circumstances contributed to their financial 
plights, employers appear to treat applicants more as autonomous, unique 
individuals, and recognize that applicants’ financial problems may have 
been precipitated by unforeseeable, external factors.  Applicants’ 
opportunity to participate in and (ostensibly) to influence employers’ 
decision-making processes may enhance the perceived legitimacy and 
                                                                                                                          
157 See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 9 (reporting that sixty-five percent of employers 
surveyed indicated that they would allow job candidates the opportunity to explain the results of their 
consumer reports prior to making the decision of whether to hire them). 
158 See Michael Eastman, Exec. Dir., Labor Law Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Statement 
at the Meeting of the U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 23 (Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter EEOC, 
Oct. 20 Meeting Tr.], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/transcript.cfm 
(“Employers are much less likely to be concerned with a debt that arose as a result of a medical issue, a 
period of unemployment or a divorce.  On the other hand, some types of debt might raise red flags 
more quickly such as gambling debt.”). 
159 See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7 (reporting that only eleven percent of 
employers surveyed indicated that a foreclosure would significantly impact their hiring decision). 
160 In contrast, many perceive statistical evaluation methods—like credit scoring methodologies—
as impersonal and callous.  See R.W. Johnson, Legal, Social, and Economic Issues in Implementing 
Scoring in the United States, in READINGS IN CREDIT SCORING: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND 
AIMS 5, 7 (Lyn C. Thomas, David B. Edelman & Jonathan N. Crook eds., 2004) (“As numerical rating 
systems, credit scoring strikes consumers as dispassionate and highly impersonal.  ‘Treat me as an 
individual’, is the cry.  Another aspect of the same, very natural concern is the admonition:  ‘Don’t treat 
me as just another member of a group’.”). 
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fairness of the processes.161  As Barbara Underwood has explained, “By 
giving the applicant the opportunity to make a claim on the personal 
attention of the decision-maker, [a decision-making] process demonstrates 
a certain respect for the personal dignity of each applicant.”162  This 
practice lends some credence to the “situationist” account of human 
behavior endorsed by behavioral realists—an approach that recognizes that 
“unseen or unappreciated influences within [individuals] and [in society]” 
heavily influence individuals’ actions and circumstances.163 
In its current form, however, this practice provides little protection to 
applicants.  Although it is unclear exactly how often and in what contexts 
employers provide applicants with the right to explain the circumstances 
that triggered their adverse financial statuses, this explanatory right is 
likely provided relatively infrequently and on an ad hoc basis.  Few 
employers have the time or resources to scrutinize many applicants’ credit 
histories in a one-on-one interview or conversation.164  Indeed, the greater 
the number of applicants who are provided with this explanatory 
opportunity, the less likely that employers can meaningfully and 
thoughtfully consider each individual applicant’s explanations. 165   
B.  An Option for Legislators:  Expanding the Mitigation Opportunity 
These deficiencies could be addressed legislatively.  To increase the 
number of applicants who are given the opportunity to provide explanatory 
statements to employers, policymakers could formalize and expand the 
Mitigation Opportunity, consistent with analogous rights consumers 
currently enjoy under the FCRA and in the insurance scoring context. 
Currently, only select applicants are given the right to describe 
mitigating factors to employers.166  This exchange of information occurs in 
                                                                                                                          
161 See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1427 (“Even if special pleading seldom affects the decision, 
and even if it may slightly impair the accuracy of aggregate decisionmaking, it may nevertheless 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of the process.”).  
162 Id. at 1428. 
163 Benforado & Hanson, supra note 21, at 314. 
164 See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1424–25 (“A clinical system requires the careful exercise of 
skilled judgment for the evaluation of each individual applicant, and therefore the marginal cost of 
evaluating additional applicants tends to be high.”).  Analogously, individualized assessment of 
applicants in the lending setting is impractical and too costly.  See Johnson, supra note 160, at 7 
(“[I]ndividual treatment is unavailable, given the volume of applicants and scarcity of skilled analysts.  
Even if such talent were available, it would be uneconomical for the credit grantor to provide the 
service because the cost would be unacceptable to consumers.”).   
165 See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1425 (noting that as the number of applicants increase, the 
accuracy decreases due to the high marginal cost); cf. Gary G. Chandler & John Y. Coffman, A 
Comparative Analysis of Empirical vs. Judgmental Credit Evaluation, J. RETAIL BANKING, Sept. 
1979, at 15, 26 (“When dealing with large numbers of applicants, it is unlikely that judgmental 
evaluation is able to deal with applicants as ‘individuals’ any better than can empirical evaluation.”). 
166 See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1724 (“[S]ome employers claim to give some applicants an 
opportunity to explain or justify bankruptcy filings or collection actions that appear on applicants’ 
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a potentially time-consuming, one-on-one interview or conversation with 
an employer following the employer’s initial review of the applicant’s 
file.167  If the Mitigation Opportunity were expanded consistent with 
consumers’ existing rights under the FCRA, the timing, the form, and the 
number of applicants provided an explanatory opportunity would change.  
All applicants would have the opportunity to describe ex ante, in a brief 
statement on consumer reports purchased by employers, what factors 
contributed to applicants’ adverse financial statuses.  
Under the FCRA, consumers are afforded numerous procedural rights 
intended to increase credit reports’ accuracy and completeness.168  At any 
time, a consumer may dispute the accuracy or completeness of information 
in her consumer report.169  For example, a consumer might assert that an 
account included on her report belongs to someone else170 or claim that a 
payment listed as late was, in fact, paid on time.171  If, following an 
investigation172 by the consumer reporting agency, the agency disagrees 
with the consumer, and the dispute is not resolved to the consumer’s 
satisfaction, a consumer who maintains her “innocence” has the 
opportunity to insert in her credit report a brief statement explaining her 
side of the story.173  This explanatory statement must be included in all 
subsequent credit reports furnished to insurers, employers, and creditors.174 
The investigation process—coupled with consumers’ right to insert 
explanatory statements in their reports—attempts to strike a balance 
between the competing interests of credit reporting agencies and 
                                                                                                                          
reports.”). 
167 See Daniel Bortz, How to Convince a Prospective Employer to Overlook Poor Credit, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.money.usnews.com/money/personal-
finance/articles/2012/12/14how-to-convince-a-prospective-employer-to-overlook-poor-credit 
(providing tips for applicants on how to explain bad credit during conversations with prospective 
employers). 
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”); id. § 1681i (providing mechanisms for a consumer 
to dispute the accuracy of information contained in a credit report). 
169 Id. § 1681i(a)(1).  After a consumer institutes a dispute, a consumer reporting agency must 
conduct a “reasonable reinvestigation” to determine whether the disputed information is accurate.  Id.  
This process is known as a “reinvestigation” (rather than an “investigation”) because the consumer 
reporting agency presumably observed quality-control procedures when it initially decided to include 
the disputed information in the consumer’s report.  WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 4.5.3.1, at 
167. 
170 See, e.g., Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 2012) (outlining facts 
of a dispute in which a consumer disputed a car loan on his report and argued that his wife, from whom 
he was separated, was solely responsible for repayment).   
171 See, e.g., Paul v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1099 (D. Minn. 2011) 
(presenting a situation in which a consumer disputed late payments in her credit report). 
172 See supra note 169 (explaining that this process by which a consumer reporting agency 
reviews disputed information is known as a “reinvestigation”). 
173 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b). 
174 Id. § 1681i(c). 
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consumers.  Congress recognized that credit reporting agencies, which 
process vast amounts of information,175 will inevitably make some errors, 
yet they cannot be exposed to excessive liability for inaccuracies.  At the 
same time, however, the FCRA’s drafters recognized that consumers must 
have a meaningful participatory role in a decision-making process that can 
heavily influence their access to employment, credit, and insurance.  These 
are resources that are indispensable to meaningful participation in the 
American economy.  The explanatory statement provides a relatively 
efficient, inexpensive means by which consumers can highlight unresolved 
problems in their reports.  
Under the FCRA, however, consumers may dispute only discrete 
objective facts on their consumer reports, like the precise balance of an 
account or the accuracy of personal information (e.g., an inaccurate address 
or employment history).  Consumers do not have the right to explain what 
extenuating circumstances contributed to a default or a bankruptcy.176  
Thus, because employers scrutinizing an applicant’s financial history claim 
to treat certain factors—like a job loss—as an extenuating circumstance, 
the FCRA could be amended to allow all applicants to insert these 
mitigating explanations in the employment reports purchased by 
employers.  Such a reform would provide all applicants—not just a 
privileged few—with a participatory role in employers’ assessment 
processes, without imposing excessive costs or constraints on employers. 
This reform, however, is unlikely to benefit applicants.  Regardless of 
whether employers provide applicants with the opportunity to “explain” 
their adverse financial histories in a one-on-one conversation or interview 
or in a brief statement on their employment reports, this opportunity likely 
constitutes a mere formality.  Although many extenuating circumstances 
cited by an applicant (e.g., a bankruptcy, a divorce, or a job loss) may be 
verifiable, an employer may suspect that financial profligacy or poor 
financial planning exacerbated the applicant’s financial difficulties.  For 
example, it may be unclear to an employer whether a bankruptcy or a debt-
collection action triggered by a medical problem or a natural disaster was 
precipitated by poor budgeting that left the applicant with too small of a 
safety net.177  Thus, because applicants’ overall explanations are largely 
                                                                                                                          
175 See, e.g., WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 1.2.2, at 4–5 (“[Consumer reporting agencies] 
receive from data furnishers approximately 4.5 billion updates on about 1.5 billion accounts for more 
than 200 million consumer files each month.”).   
176 16 C.F.R. § 611, item 4 (2011).  The FTC’s Official Staff Commentary explains that a credit 
reporting agency may—but need not—include such an explanation.  Id.  According to the FTC, “Most 
creditors are aware that a variety of circumstances may render consumers unable to repay credit 
obligations.”  Id.  
177 Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical Significance, but 
Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 245–46 (2001).  
Professor Jacoby explains this problem in the context of medical debt as follows: 
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subjective and are not easily verified, they would likely carry little weight.  
Rather, if an employer hires an applicant after considering the applicant’s 
proffered explanations, the employer likely places little credence in credit 
histories as an evaluative tool or the applicant has significant skills or 
attributes that compensate for his or her suboptimal financial history. 
In the latter case, the employer’s interpretation of an adverse financial 
event may be influenced by confirmation bias.  Confirmation bias causes 
individuals to “frame newly acquired ambiguous or even contradictory 
information . . . so as to make it consistent with information they acquired 
earlier.”178  Because an applicant’s explanation for an adverse financial 
event may be ambiguous, an employer may interpret the explanation in a 
way that reinforces the employer’s expectations.  As a result, the 
explanatory opportunity will most likely not significantly impact an 
employer’s decision-making process.  
Policymakers could address the risk that employers might not seriously 
heed candidates’ explanations by mandating that employers consider 
applicants’ articulated mitigating factors.  A similar reform was adopted in 
the insurance industry.  In some states, insurers—who use consumer 
reports in the process of granting and pricing insurance policies179—are 
statutorily required to consider whether debtors’ adverse financial 
circumstances were caused by certain extraordinary life events, including 
catastrophic illness, the death of a close family member, the involuntary 
loss of employment, identity theft, or dissolution of marriage.180   
                                                                                                                          
One might challenge the assumption that medical-related filers are less culpable and 
thus risky chapter 13 filers.  After all, people with health problems are not 
necessarily innocent victims of bad luck and insufficient safety nets.  Putting aside 
sensitive questions of whether these individuals engaged in activities or behavior 
that increased their risk of illness or injury, American families tend to spend a lot 
and save little.  They generally fail to plan for the possibility of disability and 
income interruption as well as they might, considering the probability of 
experiencing these setbacks.  Indeed, some might assert that the availability of 
generous bankruptcy relief encourages consumers to under-insure.  One could argue, 
therefore, that the vulnerability of these families to medical-related financial distress 
is partly self-inflicted and is simply a consequence of other spending and saving 
decisions similar to those that debtors like Mr. Plastic made. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
178 RICHARD O. YOUNG, HOW AUDIENCES DECIDE:  A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO BUSINESS 
COMMUNICATION 207–08 (2011). 
179 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSURANCE, supra note 48, at 2.  
180 Model Act Regarding Use of Credit Information in Personal Insurance, NAT’L CONF. INS. 
LEGISLATORS 4–5 (2009), http://www.ncoil.org/Docs/CreditScoringModel.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014).  This Model Act—including the “extraordinary life circumstances” exception—has been 
adopted by several states, including Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Connecticut.  Sheila 
Coolidge, Credit Scoring Use: Extraordinary Life Circumstances Exception Creates Added Consumer 
Protection, WOLTERS KLUWER COMPLIANCE CORNER, 
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Forcing employers to consider applicants’ explanations, however, may 
be problematic.  As discussed above, because applicants’ explanations may 
not, in fact, be verifiable, employers may have difficulty making objective 
distinctions among candidates.  As a result, employers’ assessments may 
decrease in accuracy.   
Likewise, requiring employers to consider applicants’ explanations 
might have a regressive impact.  Because applicants’ explanations cannot 
be easily or meaningfully differentiated on the merits, individuals who 
furnish the most convincing explanations to employers are not necessarily 
more deserving of an employer’s compassion.  Rather, these individuals 
may simply be more affluent, sophisticated, and financially literate.  A 
consumer who convincingly describes in her consumer report those 
extenuating factors that contributed to her financial problems likely enjoys 
several advantages that are correlated with wealth and education:  she 
possesses knowledge of her rights; enjoys ready access to her credit report 
(and/or can afford a subscription to a credit-monitoring service); and has 
the wherewithal to present a forceful, articulate explanation to a 
prospective employer.181 
Thus, expanding the Mitigation Opportunity would probably not 
significantly benefit applicants, since such a reform is unlikely to change 
the outcome of employment decisions.  This reform, however, might 
substantially advance employers’ interests.  Giving applicants a greater 
participatory role in employers’ evaluation processes functions to forestall 
more stringent forms of regulation.   
In recent years, employers’ consideration of financial histories in the 
hiring process has generated vociferous protest.  Indeed, consumers’ and 
commentators’ opposition to the practice has triggered bans in several 
states.  Employers and employer advocates presumably recognize that this 
regulatory shift—prompted by the public’s reservations about the 
practice—can be delayed or forestalled if (1) employers can be portrayed 
as empathetic and flexible, (2) consumers are told that they have a “voice” 
in an otherwise depersonalized assessment process, and (3) it is clear that 
only truly “undeserving” debtors will likely suffer discrimination.182  If 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.insurancecompliancecorner.com/credit-scoring-use-extraordinary-life-circumstances-
exception-creates-added-consumer-protection/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
181 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Mandatory Arbitration and Distributive Equity: An Essay on Access to 
Justice 14–16 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 628, 
Jan. 2013), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/628.obs_.access-revised.pdf (arguing 
that mandatory disclosures create a regressive wealth transfer, since better-off and more sophisticated 
consumers make better use of the information disclosed).  
182 Cf. Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and 
Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1507 (2004) (arguing that the “Over-Consumption Myth”—which 
suggests that consumers’ financial distress is caused by their own profligacy—serves to forestall 
regulation of creditors, because “if only the stupid or the venal are caught in a tangle of credit, then 
there is no reason to restrict the lenders”).   
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consumer anxieties are assuaged, consumers are less likely to complain to 
legislators, and legislators are less likely to seek to fully enjoin the use of 
credit reports in the hiring process.   
A similar trend can be seen in the insurance scoring context.  The 
requirement in some states that insurers consider whether debtors’ adverse 
financial circumstances were caused by certain extraordinary life events183 
may have been prompted by insurers’ concerns that consumer discomfort 
with the use of insurance scores would likely result in additional state bans 
on the practice.184   
For these reasons, expanding the Mitigation Opportunity would only 
provide applicants with superficial protection against discrimination and 
inequitable treatment.  In addition, this reform would not improve the 
accuracy of employers’ assessment procedures.  Ironically, although giving 
applicants a greater participatory role in employers’ evaluation processes 
seemingly humanizes a bureaucratic and inflexible assessment method, it 
may, in fact, increase the likelihood that applicants will be treated unfairly.  
As a result, this Article considers whether an alternative approach—
encouraging employers to use financial history information as part of a 
statistically sound evaluation method—can better address these important 
shortcomings.   
V.  THE PROSPECT OF REDUCING DISCRIMINATION THROUGH  
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION METHOD 
Due to the deficiencies of the options discussed above—imposing 
limits on employers’ inquiry into applicants’ credit history and increasing 
consumers’ participatory role in employers’ assessment processes—this 
Article considers an alternative approach.  Although antidiscrimination 
efforts have traditionally focused on suppressing consideration of 
information, because bans may be impracticable, anti-discriminatory 
objectives may be more readily advanced if employers adopted an 
empirically derived, statistically sound evaluation method to scrutinize 
applicants. 
In Section A, I describe employers’ current subjective evaluation 
method.  Employers presently scrutinize the raw data on applicants’ reports 
(i.e., lists of financial events, such as collection actions, defaults, and 
                                                                                                                          
183 See supra note 180 (outlining the states that adopted this requirement). 
184 See, e.g., Property-Casualty Insurance Trades Support NCOIL Amendment to Its Model Law 
on Credit, PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N AM. (July 14, 2009), http://www.pciaa.net/publish/web/
webpress.nsf/lookupwebcontent/71d4a6041319c96e862575f30077282?opendocument (“Insurers 
believe that [the ‘extraordinary life circumstances’ amendment] will provide necessary consumer 
protections during a challenging economic climate while preserving insurers’ use of credit-based 
insurance scoring, which remains a well-established underwriting and rating tool that continues to 
benefit consumers.”). 
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bankruptcy filings), from which they infer, based on intuition and past 
experience, whether an applicant is likely to be a responsible, law-abiding 
employee.  I argue that this approach, which I analogize to the 
“judgmental” evaluation methods used by most creditors before the 
widespread adoption of credit scoring technologies, promotes 
discrimination and stereotyping.   
In Section B, I consider whether and to what extent policymakers can 
reduce the potential for discrimination by adopting an empirical evaluation 
method analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores and insurers’ use of 
credit-based insurance scores.  While this approach may perpetuate some 
forms of discrimination (most notably disparate impact), it has the 
potential to advance certain anti-discriminatory objectives not likely to be 
achieved by bans on the use of financial history information, consumer-
empowerment techniques, or employers’ current assessment methods.  
A.  Employers’ Current Approach Promotes Discrimination 
Currently, employers use only the raw data in consumer reports to 
make assessments about job candidates.  They consider applicants’ 
personal information, payment history, and public record information to 
infer whether applicants possess certain personality traits relevant to work 
performance.185  Employers do not use credit scores or any other statistical 
evaluation methods.186 
Employers’ assessments share a few commonalities.  A recent survey 
indicated that sixty-four percent of employers consider current outstanding 
judgments when determining whether to extend a job offer.187  In addition, 
less than three percent of employers claim to seriously consider education-
related debt and medical debt.188 
Excluding these categories, however, there are few consistencies 
among employers in those criteria identified as most likely to impact 
employment decisions.  Half of employers consider accounts in debt 
collection, one-quarter consider bankruptcy filings,189 and approximately 
                                                                                                                          
185 See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7 (illustrating the factors that employers 
consider when making hiring decisions). 
186 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (explaining that credit reporting agencies do not 
provide employers with credit scores or raw credit history data). 
187 Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7.  Employers were asked, “In general, if a credit 
background check revealed information that presented the job candidate’s financial situation 
negatively, what types of information are MOST likely to affect your decision to NOT extend a job 
offer?”  Id.  
188 Id.  
189 Id.  Although the Bankruptcy Code contains several antidiscrimination provisions intended to 
protect applicants and employees, 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b) (2012), almost all courts have interpreted 
these provisions to authorize private—but not public—employers to refuse to hire bankruptcy filers.  
See, e.g., Fiorani v. Caci, 192 B.R. 401, 407 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (“If a private employer is to be 
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one-fifth of employers consider a high debt-to-income ratio very important 
in scrutinizing applicants.190  These statistics are reproduced in Figure 1 
below. 
FIGURE 1 
TYPES OF CREDIT REPORTING INFORMATION MOST LIKELY TO AFFECT AN 
EMPLOYER’S DECISION NOT TO EXTEND A JOB OFFER191 
  
These data suggest that employers’ conclusions may have a tendency 
to be idiosyncratic.192  Employers are not necessarily consistent in 
assessing outstanding judgments, collection actions, bankruptcy filings, 
debt-to-income ratios, foreclosures, tax liens, education debt, and medical 
debt.  This observation reinforces the Vermont General Legislature’s 
                                                                                                                          
prohibited from refusing to hire an applicant because that person has filed for bankruptcy, Congress 
must say so, which it as [sic] not yet done.”). 
190 Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7. 
191 This figure is a reproduction based on information provided by the SHRM.  Background 
Checking, supra note 2, slide 7.  Because employers were asked to select their top two choices, the total 
percentage is greater than 100%.  Id. 
192 In the SHRM survey, employers were permitted to select the top two items of adverse 
information that would most likely impact their decision not to hire a job candidate.  Id.  The 
imposition of this restriction suggests that employers’ responses should reflect a greater degree of 
convergence or overlap.  As I discuss below, however, it is possible that the significant divergence in 
employers’ responses reflects reasonable distinctions different employers make when filling different 
positions. 
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conclusion that “[t]here is no common standard among employers as to 
how to interpret credit reports.”193 
As a result, although employers appear generally to favor applicants 
who are likely to have higher credit scores,194 employers probably weigh 
the specific raw data in consumer reports differently.  Some employers 
may be more troubled about an applicant’s total debt load, based on a 
concern that a larger debt-to-income ratio suggests that the applicant is 
more likely to commit fraud or theft.  Other employers may be more 
apprehensive about an applicant’s record of debt repayment, regardless of 
her overall debt load.  For example, an applicant may have little debt (as a 
result of a bankruptcy discharge or some other out-of-court settlement with 
creditors), but the employer may nevertheless be concerned that the 
applicant failed to fulfill his or her financial promises.  In other words, 
some employers may use financial history as a predictive tool, whereas 
others may reward applicants on the basis of financial or ethical “merit.”195  
There may be a fundamental tension between these two uses. 
These data do not conclusively establish that these disparities in 
employers’ approaches reflect irrational inconsistencies. It is possible that 
employers’ emphasis on different adverse financial data is necessitated by 
employers’ specific needs and the responsibilities involved in varying 
positions.  For example, an employer who recently suffered significant 
embezzlement by an employee may be more attentive to an applicant’s 
likelihood of committing fraud or theft, whereas another employer may be 
more interested in screening for candidates’ overall responsibility levels.  
The variables on which employers place the most weight need not 
necessarily be consistent from employer to employer in order for the 
methodology to be valid.  The degree of variance in the criteria that 
employers’ identify as the most important factors, however, coupled with 
the dearth of empirical evidence supporting consideration of any particular 
factor or factors,196 suggests that employers’ disparate approaches may be 
more arbitrary than logical.  
In many ways, employers’ seemingly idiosyncratic assessment 
methods are analogous to the judgmental underwriting systems used by 
                                                                                                                          
193 2012 Vt. Acts & Resolves 556. 
194 What’s in My FICO Score: How My FICO Score Is Calculated, MYFICO, 
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) 
(describing the extent to which certain categories of information are used in calculating a consumer’s 
credit score).  Consumers can improve their credit scores by, for example, reducing their debt loads and 
paying their bills on time.  How to Repair My Credit and Improve My FICO Credit Score, MYFICO, 
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/ImproveYourScore.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
195 See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1418 (comparing “criteria that purport to punish fault and 
reward merit” with “predictive criteria” in the context of school admission and the release of convicted 
criminals). 
196 See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (describing flaws in the available studies of 
employees’ financial situations). 
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creditors before the widespread adoption of credit scores.  Before advances 
in credit scoring technologies in the 1970s and 1980s,197 credit decisions 
were made “manually” by a loan officer at a financial institution.198  After 
gathering certain financial information from a prospective borrower, a loan 
officer would conclude whether an applicant possessed both the ability and 
willingness to repay a loan based on the officer’s own prior experience and 
the financial institution’s guidelines.199 
Historically, creditors have lauded the judgmental approach for being 
both personal and flexible.200  Like the Mitigation Opportunity that some 
employers claim to provide to certain applicants, judgmental evaluation 
methods appear to demonstrate a degree of respect for the personal dignity 
of each applicant.201  A judgmental approach likewise maximizes creditor 
autonomy by respecting a loan officer’s ability to make seemingly logical 
distinctions among candidates, consistent with the financial institution’s 
underlying goals and the loan officer’s experience with other borrowers.202 
Judgmental underwriting, however, is inherently subjective.  Decisions 
rely on the “experience and human judgment of the individual [credit] 
analyst.”203  According to one lender, judgmental underwriting reflects 
“how [the decision-maker] feel[s] that day.”204  One bank president using 
such an evaluation method explained that credit decisions could be based 
in part on first impressions received from personally conversing with 
prospective customers.205 
                                                                                                                          
197 FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4. 
198 Id. 
199 See, e.g., David C. Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS 
L.J. 371, 373 (1978) (stating that credit officers look to an applicant’s ability and willingness to repay a 
loan); Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s Specificity Requirement: 
Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 73, 86 (1980) (discussing the subjective 
evaluation system for deciding whether or not to grant credit).  
200 See Taylor, supra note 199, at 102 (“Many creditors who use judgmental systems consider 
informality and flexibility to be the system’s major assets.”). 
201 See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1428 (“By giving the applicant the opportunity to make a 
claim on the personal attention of the decisionmaker, a clinical decision process demonstrates a certain 
respect for the personal dignity of each applicant.”). 
202 See Taylor, supra note 199, at 86 (“The credit manager evaluates the character, capacity and 
collateral of the applicant . . . [and] makes a professional judgment to grant or deny credit, relying in 
part on his past experience . . . .”). 
203 Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 17; see Hsia, supra note 199, at 372 (“Traditional 
credit analysis uses human judgment to evaluate creditworthiness.  Credit officers analyze incoming 
applications in light of their own prior experience and their employer’s institutional guidelines.”). 
204 Janet Sonntag, The Debate over Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1995, at 46, 47 
(quoting Ken Sacknoff, Director of Corporate Risk for GMAC Residential Funding Corporation).  
205 Taylor, supra note 199, at 102. 
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The subjective nature of the judgmental underwriting process 
contributes to imprecise, inaccurate, and inconsistent decision making.206  
Credit decisions may be affected by the loan officer’s “imperfect 
recollection of past experience.”207  Likewise, one very negative or 
troublesome incident may distort the loan officer’s future perception of a 
particular applicant group.208  Even judgmental underwriting decisions 
made within the same financial institution may be inconsistent, since 
different loan officers may interpret the same credit risks differently.209  In 
a judgmental underwriting system, it is difficult to institute clear guidelines 
that can address many factual differences in consumers’ credit profiles.210 
These defects are shared by employers’ current assessment methods. 
Because employers—like loan officers relying on a judgmental 
underwriting system—are permitted to act on hunches,211 employers may 
be influenced less by analytical judgments than by heuristics, memories, 
and past experience.  The “availability heuristic,” for example, might 
distort an employer’s recollection of past events.  Pursuant to this mental 
shortcut, individuals assess the probability of an event by the ease with 
which such instances can be brought to mind.212  If, for example, an 
employer attempts to predict whether a given applicant who has filed for 
bankruptcy is likely to exhibit counterproductive work behaviors, her 
conclusion may be unduly influenced by one salient past experience: 
memories of one particular bankruptcy filer whom the employer had to 
terminate on performance grounds.213  In other words, an employer’s past 
“baggage” can diminish any predictive force of a judgmental evaluation 
method.214 
                                                                                                                          
206 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4 (“Both credit scoring 
and judgmental underwriting tend to be opaque processes. . . . [M]ethods are not likely 
consistent . . . .”). 
207 Hsia, supra note 199, at 373. 
208 Id. 
209 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4 (“In the case of 
judgmental underwriting, methods are not likely consistent, even within a firm, because evaluators 
differ in their experience and judgment about credit risk . . . .”). 
210  Id. 
211 See Taylor, supra note 199, at 102 (describing how credit managers can deny or grant credit 
based on a “hunch,” even when the applicant would have been otherwise denied or accepted). 
212 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974) (“There are situations in which people assess the frequency of 
a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to 
mind.”). 
213 Cf. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 19 (explaining that “generally, the focus of 
information [in judgmental underwriting systems] is biased heavily toward bad accounts that have been 
approved in the past as these are the exceptions brought to the attention of the lender”). 
214 Commentators have made analogous arguments about law enforcement officers’ decision-
making processes.  See, e.g., Harold Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is that Enough? The Irrationality of 
Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 91–92, 100 (2007) (arguing that “hunch-based investigative 
approaches” used in the law enforcement setting may often be inaccurate, since police officers “face 
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Furthermore, both judgmental underwriting systems and employers’ 
current subjective financial history assessment methods are problematic 
from an antidiscrimination perspective, since both are likely to encourage 
stereotyping by decision-makers.  A significant body of psychological 
research demonstrates that stereotyping is most likely to occur when the 
evaluative criteria are ambiguous.215  This problem is exacerbated when the 
information being interpreted is also open to interpretation.216   
Under employers’ current assessment methods, decision-makers are 
not required to commit in advance to any particular evaluative criteria or 
method of weighing those criteria.217  Instead, the employer “is free to 
respond to individual differences whose relevance was not anticipated by 
any rule.”218  Although this flexibility may at times seem beneficial, since 
it permits employers to give some borderline applicants the “benefit of the 
doubt,” there is a significant risk that employers will act on negative 
stereotypes about various protected groups.  An employer, for example, 
might be more inclined to reject the application of a minority applicant 
with an adverse credit history based on stereotypes that African-Americans 
or other minorities are more likely to default on loans,219 commit crimes,220 
or exhibit irresponsibility.221  Recent research on implicit bias suggests that 
                                                                                                                          
hostile and frightening situations daily and consequently fall easy victim to unconscious feelings of 
bias, prejudice, and the availability heuristic”). 
215 Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 1049, 1050 (1991); Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit 
Bias in Impression Formation: Associations Influence the Construal of Individuating Information, 33 
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 573, 586 (2003); Ziva Kunda & Bonnie Sherman-Williams, Stereotypes and the 
Construal of Individuating Information, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PYCHOL. BULL. 90, 91 (1993).  
216 Fiske et al., supra note 215, at 1050. 
217 See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1423 (“A clinical decisionmaker is not committed in 
advance of decision to the factors that will be considered and the rule for combining them.”). 
218 Id. 
219 See Sara T. DeLoughy, Risk Versus Demographics in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Evidence 
from Three Connecticut Cities, 45 J. REAL EST. FIN. ECON. 569, 585–86 (2012) (presenting evidence of 
a positive association between subprime lending and minority borrowers); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et 
al., Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home Loan Pricing, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 110, 123 (2008) (“African-
American and Latino borrowers are more likely to receive higher-priced subprime credit than similarly 
situated white borrowers.”). 
220 See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398–99 (2007) (reporting that study participants consistently 
recalled more facts suggestive of aggressiveness in fact patterns involving a character named 
“Tyronne” than in fact patterns involving a character named “William”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, 
Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional 
Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 447–49 (2004) (“Racial profiling due to stereotypical biases 
also has a direct correlation to the high incarceration rate of African-American males . . . .”). 
221 See James R. Kluegel, Trends in Whites’ Explanations of the Black-White Gap in 
Socioeconomic Status, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 512, 523 (1990) (stating that whites believe the black-white 
socioeconomic gap to be due to lack of education, ability, and motivation); Mark Peffley et al., Racial 
Stereotypes and Whites’ Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 AM. J. POL. 
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employers may render these assessments subconsciously, in the absence of 
any affirmative discriminatory intent.222 
B.   How a Statistical Scoring System Could Reduce the Potential for 
Discrimination 
Instead of using the raw data in consumer reports to make subjective 
assessments about applicants, employers could adopt an empirically based, 
statistically sound evaluation method by applying existing credit-scoring 
methodologies to employers’ assessment processes.  Currently, creditors 
use the raw data in credit reports to generate credit scores, or numeral 
ratings of credit applicants’ creditworthiness.223  Similarly, insurers use 
credit data to generate credit-based insurance scores, which they use to 
predict the number or total cost of insurance claims that prospective 
customers are likely to file.224  Employers could likewise apply a similar 
methodology to the hiring process to predict the probability that an 
applicant will, for example, commit theft or fraud in the workplace or 
exhibit certain counterproductive work behaviors.  In other words, 
employers—like insurers and creditors—can use empirical methods to 
measure their likelihood of suffering specific financial losses.   
If employers used an empirically derived, statistically sound evaluation 
method to scrutinize applicants, employers’ use of credit histories might 
yield more consistent, less discriminatory results than they do presently.  In 
the subsections that follow, I examine the benefits and the drawbacks of 
adopting a statistical method. 
1.    An Employment Scoring Method Could Maximize Empirical 
Soundness 
An employment scoring system has the potential to counter the most 
powerful critique of employers’ current evaluation methods: there exists 
insufficient evidence establishing a correlation between applicants’ credit 
history and traits relevant to job performance.225  Employers have long 
                                                                                                                          
SCI. 30, 35 (1997) (“[A] substantial proportion of whites agree[] that most blacks are lazy (31%), 
irresponsible (20%), aggressive (50%), and lacking in discipline (60%).”). 
222 See generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break 
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 750–59 (1995) (describing the psychological literature on 
unconscious bias); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their 
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 145–46 (2004) (examining a study that began 
research on implicit racial biases); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 969–72 (2006) (discussing the Implicit Association Test for measuring implicit 
bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493–94 (2005) (evaluating the 
literature on implicit bias). 
223 FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at S-1. 
224 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSURANCE, supra note 48, at 2. 
225 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (examining how studies do not establish a 
correlation between applicants who have committed financial crimes and financial stress). 
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relied primarily on anecdotal evidence to support their use of credit 
histories.226  Consequently, employers remain vulnerable to criticisms that 
they have been prematurely ejecting many qualified individuals from the 
labor market, thereby undermining their own interests and prompting an 
unfair post-recessionary reallocation of jobs.  
A statistical scoring method would help ensure that employers consider 
only those credit history variables that are related to characteristics relevant 
to success in the workplace.  Unlike employers’ current “judgmental” 
assessment methods, a statistical approach would incorporate only those 
credit history variables that are correlated at a statistically significant level 
with certain discrete characteristics related to an applicant’s 
(1) responsibility levels, or (2) propensity to commit theft.227  It would 
exclude other irrelevant factors. 
While it is difficult to predict what statistical correlations, if any, 
would be revealed by an employment scoring model, a statistical approach 
could test important hypotheses relevant to the normative debate about 
employers’ use of financial history information.  It is possible, for 
example, that applicants with significant student loan debt may be more—
rather than less—likely to exhibit responsibility in the employment setting.  
The acquisition of student loan debt can be perceived as a positive (albeit 
increasingly precarious228) step that reflects a job applicant’s initiative and 
a desire to improve his or her life standing.  Indeed, a certain amount of 
student loan debt may motivate prospective employees to be productive 
members of society, thereby increasing their dependence on (and loyalty 
to) particular employers.  This theory—which might seem counterintuitive 
to those employers concerned that any significant accumulation of debt 
increases an applicant’s likelihood of committing fraud or theft229—could 
be tested by a statistical evaluation method. 
Likewise, a statistical approach could test whether an applicant who 
has discharged a sizeable amount of debt in bankruptcy would be more or 
less likely to exhibit irresponsibility or to commit fraud or theft than would 
a similarly indebted applicant who has not filed for bankruptcy.  A 
bankruptcy discharge—by reducing an applicant’s overall debt load—
could conceivably reduce an applicant’s stress or distractedness level, 
thereby permitting him to focus more diligently on his job responsibilities.   
                                                                                                                          
226 See Bernerth et al., supra note 74, at 469 (“Existing evidence in this regard is largely anecdotal 
in nature, as practitioners contend that credit scores offer insight into an applicant’s character.”). 
227 See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (“[E]mpirically derived scoring systems use 
only information that is statistically related to credit risk.”). 
228 See Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in Past Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2011, at A14 (reporting an 8.8% default rate on student loans). 
229 Why Filing Bankruptcy Might Be the Worst Thing You Could Do for Your Career, supra note 
6. 
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Similarly, an employment scoring model could measure whether a 
bankruptcy filer’s successful fulfillment of the terms of a Chapter 13 plan 
increases his or her responsibility levels.  Because completion of a Chapter 
13 plan requires three to five years of diligent budgeting and repayment to 
creditors,230 a statistical analysis might reveal that a successful Chapter 13 
filer has learned important financial management skills that could translate 
to success in the employment setting.  Through statistical inference, an 
employer could deduce that such an applicant has overcome adversity—a 
trait that employers might covet in an employee.  
It is, of course, unrealistic to suggest that the correlations revealed by 
an employment scoring system would favor the opinions only of those who 
support a reduced or more nuanced consideration of credit history 
information by employers.  Nevertheless, any counterintuitive findings 
would require employers to adjust their current assumptions about the 
relationship between financial distress and job performance—a 
development that would, at the very least, increase the practice’s facial 
validity and its accuracy. 
These hypotheticals are oversimplified and reflect an analysis of only 
one independent variable (one aspect of an applicant’s credit history, like a 
bankruptcy filing) and one dependent variable (a particular adverse 
outcome, like an increase in an applicant’s likelihood of stealing 
customers’ personal or financial information).  In reality, a statistical 
system would allow employers, through multivariate analysis, to consider 
the intercorrelation of many pieces of information.231  Thus, an 
employment scoring method can interpret data more powerfully than can 
employers using existing assessment methods.232  Employers who roughly 
analyze the raw data in an applicant’s credit history to identify possible 
correlations are substantially constrained, since they are limited in their 
                                                                                                                          
230 See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.25, at 105 (2009) (“In 
chapter 13 the debtor retains his property and pays creditors pursuant to a court-approved plan over 
three to five years.”); see also Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 4th 
Edition, § 4.17, CH13ONLINE.COM, http://www.ch13online.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (arguing 
that some debtors require “the control, regularity, and supervision of a Chapter 13 case,” because, 
among other things, a Chapter 13 debtor “must learn to live within a budget and to make regular 
payments to fund a plan,” an educational experience that often constitutes “the debtor’s first experience 
with control of earning and spending habits”). 
231 See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 21 (explaining how multivariate analysis allows 
for the simultaneous consideration of a number of predictive factors, including age, income, residence, 
and job tenure). 
232 See id. (showing that an employment scoring model is more powerful than traditional 
assessment methods because of the use of multivariate analysis, which more accurately weighs the 
relevant factors in an employment decision). 
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ability to simultaneously process many individual pieces of relevant 
information.233 
A statistical scoring method would impose on employers a more 
rigorous standard than that applied by courts in Title VII challenges to the 
use of credit scores in the hiring process.234  In several lawsuits, plaintiffs 
have argued that employers’ use of credit scores—although a facially 
neutral, seemingly benign practice—has a disproportionate adverse impact 
on protected groups, including minorities.235  Employers, however, have 
successfully averted these challenges, since courts have agreed that credit 
report checks, although disproportionately affecting protected classes, are 
both job-related and consistent with business necessity.236  For example, 
according to one court, credit checks are justified in filling banking 
positions, which involve the exercise of fiduciary responsibility and access 
to substantial amounts of cash.237  Courts have not mandated, however, that 
employers rely on known correlations between credit histories and those 
personality traits relevant to job performance.238  Instead, courts have 
effectively rubber-stamped employers’ unsubstantiated assessments of 
business necessity.239  A statistical approach, in contrast, would help ensure 
that employers consider credit histories only to the extent justified by 
validated algorithms. 
2.  A Statistical Method Could Reduce the Likelihood of Intentional 
Discrimination 
Plaintiffs can successfully challenge an employment practice under 
Title VII if they “demonstrate that the employer was motivated by racial or 
                                                                                                                          
233 See id. (explaining that a loan analyst cannot simultaneously analyze all information related to 
creditworthiness because human decision-making powers are limited). 
234 It has been relatively easy for employers to overcome Title VII challenges by asserting that the 
use of a credit reports is consistent with business necessity.  An employment scoring model, in contrast, 
would require employers to show that a demonstrated correlation exists between adverse financial 
histories and personality traits relevant to job performance.  Compare Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n v. United Va. Bank, No. 75-166-N, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13587, at *39–40 (E.D. Va. Oct. 
7, 1977) (holding that consideration of credit checks in filling bank positions is job related as business 
necessity because the job involves handling money), aff’d, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), with Chandler 
& Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (explaining that employment scoring models only consider 
characteristics that are statistically related to credit risk, while a judgmental evaluation method might 
cause individuals to subconsciously consider prohibited characteristics). 
235 See, e.g., United Va. Bank, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13587, at *39–40 (evaluating a claim that 
banks’ use of credit reports “disproportionately excluded blacks from [the] work force”). 
236 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining that courts have broadly interpreted 
business necessity to include the practice of using credit reports in hiring decisions). 
237 United Va. Bank, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13587, at *39–40.  
238 See, e.g., id. (upholding the use of a credit check in the hiring of a bank employee absent any 
showing of the statistical relevance of the practice). 
239 See, e.g., id. (“It is not improper for a bank to check into the financial background of anyone 
they are considering hiring . . . .”). 
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other animus at the precise moment the adverse employment action was 
taken.”240  In other words, employers are prohibited from deliberately 
discriminating against an applicant because of his or her race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin.241  The likelihood of intentional discrimination 
(known as “disparate treatment”)242 could be substantially reduced in a 
statistical scoring system.  
Under employers’ existing “judgmental” evaluation methods,243 it is 
difficult to determine whether employers discriminated intentionally 
against applicants, since it is difficult to deduce whether an employer 
consciously or unconsciously considered a prohibited characteristic.244  As 
I discuss above, stereotyping and subjectivity may impact employers’ 
decision-making processes because employers are free at any time to alter 
the criteria by which they evaluate candidates’ financial histories, and it 
may be difficult for employers to interpret the significance of certain 
adverse financial events.245 
If employers formally excluded prohibited criteria—like sex and 
race—from an employment scoring model,246 then the likelihood of 
employers discriminating against applicants because of applicants’ 
membership in a protected category would be substantially reduced.  
Indeed, historically, some credit scoring advocates presumed that banks’ 
adoption of credit scoring methodologies would automatically insulate 
these financial institutions from challenges under various 
antidiscrimination and fair lending laws.247  They presumed that, at least in 
                                                                                                                          
240 Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005). 
241 Title VII describes “an unlawful employment practice” as an employer’s (1) failure or refusal 
to hire, or (2) discharge of any individual “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
242 See John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching 
Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709, 718 n.43 (2002) (explaining 
how the disparate treatment proof structure is used to prove cases of intentional discrimination).  
243 See supra Part V.A.  
244 See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (discussing how difficult it is for loan officers 
to eliminate biased decisions when they may consider prohibited characteristics either consciously or 
unconsciously). 
245 See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text (explaining that stereotyping occurs when 
employers are free to alter the evaluative criteria and as a result there is a “risk that employers will act 
on negative stereotypes about various protected groups”). 
246 See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (explaining that an employer can comply with 
restrictions against considering race or sex in employment decisions by simply excluding these 
prohibited characteristics from an employment scoring model). 
247 See Warren L. Dennis, Fair Lending and Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1995, at 
55, 56 (“[C]redit-scoring advocates point to credit-scoring systems as helpful to defend against 
discrimination charges . . . .”).  The same argument has been expressed more recently.  See, e.g., FED. 
RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-7 (“Some observers maintain that reliance on 
automated credit-evaluation systems such as credit scoring serves to reduce the potential for 
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theory, a statistical system is “‘blind’ to overt or subtle preconceptions 
about racial or lifestyle factors.”248  Because the race and gender of an 
applicant are “unknown to the personnel in a remote data processing 
center,” decision-makers using credit scoring technologies appear 
incapable of considering prohibited factors, like an applicant’s gender or 
race.249  
This perspective, however, is too sanguine and lacks nuance.  Even if a 
statistical method could reduce the risk of intentional discrimination by 
employers, these benefits could easily be eclipsed by residual 
discriminatory treatment in the hiring process.  For example, any non-
discriminatory impact of an employment-scoring model could be negated 
by an employer’s manual “override” of the preliminary decisions 
suggested by an algorithm.250  If an employer’s algorithm were to yield a 
negative employment “score,” thus suggesting that an applicant may pose a 
substantial fraud or irresponsibility risk, an employer might discount these 
results by providing certain applicants—or members of select groups—
with the “benefit of the doubt.”  If an employer could selectively discount 
the results of a statistical evaluation method, goals of accuracy and 
nondiscrimination would be undermined.  At that juncture, employers’ 
biases could easily be injected into the decision-making process.  And 
these biases, as cognitive psychologists have shown, are difficult to 
suppress.251  Implicit biases may not even be known to the decision-
maker,252 and the effects of implicit bias are not currently actionable under 
existing employment discrimination tests.253 
The anti-discriminatory effects of a statistical methodology may be 
compromised for another, related reason.  Even if a statistical approach 
could reduce the likelihood of deliberate discrimination by employers, 
                                                                                                                          
discrimination in lending because the automated nature of the process reduces the potential for bias to 
influence lending outcomes.”). 
248 Dennis, supra note 247, at 56. 
249 Id. at 56–57. 
250 Cf. FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-7 (explaining that disparate 
treatment could arise in an otherwise nondiscriminatory credit scoring model if lenders “exercise 
‘overrides’ for some populations or in some circumstances”). 
251 See Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7 TRENDS 
IN COGNITIVE SCI. 454, 455 (2003) (“[T]he influence of prior beliefs is extremely difficult to 
suppress . . . .”).  
252 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1239 (1995) (“[There is 
a] faulty assumption that disparate treatment discrimination necessarily manifests discriminatory 
motive or intent . . . .”). 
253 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Unconscious bias . . . generates inequalities that our current 
antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to solve.”); Krieger, supra note 252, at 1164 (arguing that 
existing Title VII jurisprudence “is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias 
that Title VII was also intended to remedy”). 
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credit histories are only one of several factors considered by employers.254  
As a result, the anti-discriminatory impact of a statistical method may be 
naturally limited by the strong probability that bias and animus may 
infiltrate other aspects of an employer’s evaluation process. 
Indeed, although the credit and insurance industries may have reduced 
discrimination through the adoption of an empirical method,255 these same 
gains may not be as achievable in the employment setting.  In evaluating 
applicants, insurers and creditors may rely on fewer non-credit criteria than 
do employers.256  Employers rely heavily on various amorphous 
qualifications, like a job candidate’s creativity, ambition, and amiability.257  
As a result, it may be easier to maximize the anti-discriminatory benefits of 
an empirical method in the insurance and credit settings than in the 
employment market.  The hiring process remains an imperfect science, 
subject to decision-makers’ cognitive limitations.  Because it is impossible 
to sanitize all employment evaluation procedures, applicants must continue 
to rely on rigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws to reduce the 
risk of suffering inequitable treatment in the employment setting. 
3.   A Statistical Method Could Have a Disparate Impact, but Adverse 
Effects Could Be Mitigated 
While an employment scoring model is likely to reduce the risk that an 
employer will deliberately discriminate against an applicant because of his 
or her membership in a protected group, a statistical method may 
nevertheless unintentionally discriminate against these individuals.  If the 
predictiveness of particular variables in the employment scoring model 
                                                                                                                          
254 See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About 
Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 228 (explaining that subjective 
factors also contribute to hiring decisions such as “interviewing presence” or “the strength of a 
candidate’s references”). 
255 See, e.g., Peter Zorn et al., Automated Underwriting and Lending Outcomes: The Effect of 
Improved Mortgage Risk Assessment on Under-served Populations 15 (U.C. Berkeley Program on 
Hous. & Urban Policy Conference Paper Series, Paper No. C01-008 2001), available at 
http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/zorn.pdf (showing that manual underwriting approved only fifty-
one percent of a sample of minority applicants for affordable loans, but Freddie Mac’s Loan Prospector 
system approved seventy-nine percent); Letter from Nat’l Credit Union Admin. to Credit Unions (Aug. 
1995), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Documents/LCU1995-174.pdf (“In general, the use 
of a properly derived credit scoring system reduces the possibility that loan policies may be 
discriminatory.”). 
256 See Stanley D. Longhofer, Mortgage Scoring and the Myth of Overrides, COMMUNITIES & 
BANKING, Fall 2002, at 18, 21, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/c&b/2002/fall/CS5.pdf 
(explaining that an applicant’s credit score is often the only factor considered in the underwriting of 
credit card loans and other personal loans, but mortgage lenders typically rely on more than just a credit 
score). 
257 Judith Bartnoff, Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in “Upper Level” Jobs, 73 
COLUM. L. REV. 1614, 1630 (1973) (asserting that employers often consider “amorphous” 
qualifications when filling positions for upper level employees). 
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stems from the fact that they are serving as proxies for applicants’ 
membership in protected populations,258 a statistical method may have a 
disparate impact on these groups. 
Various studies, for example, have established that minorities are more 
likely to have lower credit scores and insurance scores than non-
minorities.259  Because employers’ algorithms would incorporate many of 
the same variables utilized in creditors’ and insurers’ models, these adverse 
outcomes are likely to persist in the employment setting.   
The risk that an employment scoring model would disproportionately 
impact minority or other groups is problematic, since employment 
scores—like insurance scores or credit scores—impact the price and 
availability of resources indispensable to meaningful participation in the 
American economy.  The purchase of insurance is necessary (and is often 
legally mandated) to minimize liability and protect one’s financial 
interests.260  Similarly, access to credit is required for wealth accumulation. 
There are ways, however, to mitigate any adverse effect of 
employment scores on protected groups.  For example, the significant 
disparity between minorities and non-minorities in credit scores may be 
caused by credit bureaus’ historic failure to include in their credit scoring 
algorithms “non-standard” sources of credit history information, including 
utility payments, payday loan histories, and rental payments.261  Because 
minorities are more likely to rent their homes262 and to use payday loans 
instead of other credit products,263 the construction of the credit scoring 
model may itself perpetuate racial inequality.  If a statistical employment 
                                                                                                                          
258 FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-7 to O-8. 
259 See id. at S-2 (“[O]n average, blacks and Hispanics have lower credit scores than non-Hispanic 
whites and Asians . . . .”). 
260 It is not uncommon that state laws require owners of cars to obtain car insurance.  See John 
Fund, HillaryCare Flops in California, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, at A10 (“California has had a law 
mandating that drivers have car insurance since 1970 and has required physical proof of insurance to 
register a car for a decade.”). 
261 See, e.g., ALYS COHEN ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION § 
6.4.2.2, at 137 (5th ed. 2009) (“Credit Scoring models often fail to include rent, utility, and other non-
standard payment histories . . . .”).  Recently, however, some credit reporting agencies have begun 
incorporating nontraditional sources of credit information in alternative credit scoring models.  See, 
e.g., id. (“[T]here have been several initiatives to establish ‘alternative’ credit profiles for populations 
without a credit history . . . .”); Lenders Across Industries Validate FICO Expansion Score’s Power, 
FICO (Feb. 2012), http://www.fico.com/en/FIResourcesLibrary/Lenders_Success_2249CS.pdf. 
(describing the new Expansion Score and how it takes into account non-traditional credit data). 
262 WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., RETHINKING RENTAL 
HOUSING: EXPANDING THE ABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/fi
les/w04-11.pdf (indicating that renters tend to be younger, tend to have lower incomes, and are more 
likely to be minorities or immigrants). 
263 AMANDA LOGAN & CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHO BORROWS FROM 
PAYDAY LENDERS?: AN ANALYSIS OF NEWLY AVAILABLE DATA 7 (2009), available at http:// 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/payday_lending.pdf. 
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model were constructed to incorporate these nontraditional sources of data, 
employers’ consideration of employment scores would be less likely to 
have a disparate impact on traditionally disadvantaged populations. 
Thus, while a statistical evaluation method cannot eliminate 
discrimination, it can more easily detect (and ameliorate) unsound 
statistical disparities among various groups.  In contrast, judgmental 
evaluation methods—in spite of their “flexible” façade264—cannot easily 
be adjusted to minimize discriminatory outcomes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article highlighted an imminent problem facing state legislators, 
who have sought to reduce the risk of inequitable, discriminatory treatment 
in the employment setting by banning employers’ use of credit reports.  
This Article argues that, even if bans reflect the most normatively palatable 
solution to the risk of financial history discrimination, they are unlikely to 
achieve their desired objectives.  Because state bans contain exemptions 
that can be broadly interpreted to encompass a large percentage of jobs, 
these laws do little to advance anti-discriminatory policies.  Likewise, even 
if these bans were more expansively drafted and robustly enforced, the 
game-theoretic “unraveling” problem would likely trigger a cascade of 
information breaches that would thwart legislators’ efforts to suppress the 
disclosure and use of credit-history information by employers.   
Because the bans that the majority of states have adopted or are 
considering adopting are likely to be ineffective, legislators must consider 
other options.  Policymakers could give consumers a greater participatory 
role in employers’ assessment processes by giving consumers the 
opportunity to insert explanatory statements in their consumer reports.  In 
these statements, consumers could explain any unforeseeable factors that 
may have contributed to their financial predicaments.  This approach, 
however, elevates form over substance.  It may serve to pacify consumers 
by appearing to give them a greater say in an evaluation process that lacks 
transparency and flexibility, but it is unlikely to have a significant impact 
on employers’ decision-making processes. 
Because of the shortcomings of these approaches, this Article 
considers an alternative.  Cognitive research suggests that employers’ 
current use of credit histories is likely to produce inconsistent and 
subjective decision making—much like the “judgmental” underwriting 
techniques used by creditors before the widespread adoption of credit 
scores.265  If employers instead adopted an empirically derived, statistically 
sound evaluation method—one analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores 
                                                                                                                          
264 See text accompanying supra note 200. 
265 FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4. 
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and insurers’ use of credit-based insurance scores—employers’ decision-
making processes may grow less discriminatory, more accurate, and more 
consistent.  This approach would help ensure that employers consider 
credit histories only to the extent justified by validated algorithms.  In 
addition, it would substantially reduce the risk that employers would 
discriminate—consciously or subconsciously—against applicants because 
of their membership in protected groups.  While a statistical approach may 
still have a disparate impact on minority communities, that adverse effect 
could be mitigated through the proper construction of an employment 
scoring model—one that incorporates “nontraditional” financial history 
data that better reflect trends in minority groups’ financial practices. 
A statistical evaluation method is not a panacea.  Its anti-
discriminatory impact might be blunted by residual discriminatory 
elements of employers’ evaluation processes.  In addition, implementing 
and constructing a valid and reliable algorithm (which requires significant 
capital outlays and large, representative data sets) may be challenging.  
The broader premise of this Article, however, is that a statistical approach 
better addresses the realities of information diffusion and the inevitable, 
disconcerting limitations of human decision-making.  If credit reporting 
information cannot be fully suppressed, legislators must be conscious of 
how that data—notwithstanding the existence or the justifiability of bans—
is likely to be utilized by decision-makers, and how this information 
infiltration may impair the fairness of hiring outcomes.  
Promoting the adoption of a statistical approach may, at first glance, 
seem counterintuitive to antidiscrimination advocates, since it fosters 
employers’ access to information that advocates have dismissed as either 
inadequately predictive or as patently unfair to use in the employment 
setting.266  This Article argues, however, that the normative debate 
surrounding employers’ use of credit histories is necessarily informed by 
informational and cognitive realities and by the unprecedented challenges 
that the burgeoning “Big Data” economy poses to antidiscrimination 
initiatives. 
 
                                                                                                                          
266 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (citing employee advocacy groups as opposing employers’ 
use of credit reports based on a lack of conclusive studies). 
